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Interactive Hashing has featured as an essential ingredient in protocols realizing
a large variety of cryptographic tasks. We present a study of this important
cryptographic tool in the information-theoretic context. We start by presenting
a security deﬁnition which is independent of any particular setting or application.
We then show that a standard implementation of Interactive Hashing satisﬁes all
the conditions of our deﬁnition. Our proof of security improves upon previous
ones in several ways. Despite its generality, it is considerably simpler. Moreover,
it establishes a tighter upper bound on the cheating probability of a dishonest
sender. Speciﬁcally, we prove that if the fraction of good strings for a dishonest
sender is f , then the probability that both outputs will be good is no larger than
15:6805￿f . This upper bound is valid for any f and is tight up to a small constant
since a sender acting honestly would get two good outputs with probability very
close to f .
We illustrate the potential of Interactive Hashing as a cryptographic primi-
tive by demonstrating eﬃcient reductions of String Oblivious Transfer with string
length k to Bit Oblivious Transfer and several weaker variants. Our reductions
incorporate tests based on Interactive Hashing that allow the sender to verify the
receiver’s adherence to the protocol without compromising the latter’s privacy.
This allows a much more eﬃcient use of the available entropy without any ap-
preciable impact on security. As a result, for Bit OT and most of its variants
n = (1 + ￿)k executions suﬃce, improving eﬃciency by a factor of two or more
compared to the most eﬃcient reductions that do not use Interactive Hashing.
As it is theoretically impossible to achieve an expansion factor n=k smaller than
1, our reductions are in fact asymptotically optimal. They are also more general
since they place no restrictions on the types of 2-universal hash families used
for Privacy Ampliﬁcation. Lastly, we present a direct reduction of String OT to
Rabin OT which uses similar methods to achieve an expansion factor of 2 + ￿
which is again asymptotically optimal.
3Résumé
Le hachage interactif ﬁgure parmi les ingrédients essentiels de plusieurs protocoles
accomplissant tout un éventail de tâches cryptographiques. Cette thèse présente,
dans le contexte de la théorie de l’information, une étude de cet important outil
cryptographique. Tout d’abord, nous déﬁnissons la sécurité indépendamment du
cadre de toute application particulière. Ensuite, nous démontrons qu’un protocole
standard réalisant le hachage interactif satisfait à toutes les conditions de notre
déﬁnition. Notre preuve de sécurité constitue une amélioration signiﬁcative par
rapport aux preuves antérieures. Malgré sa généralité, elle est considérablement
plus simple. De plus, elle établit une borne supérieure plus serrée sur la probabilité
de succès d’un expéditeur malhonnête. Plus précisément, nous prouvons que si
l’expéditeur commence avec un ensemble de bonnes chaînes de bits représentant
une fraction f du total, la probabilité que les deux valeurs de sortie soient bonnes
ne dépasse pas 15:6805 ￿ f . Cette borne supérieure vaut pour toute fraction f
et est juste à une petite constante près puisqu’un expéditeur suivant le protocole
obtiendrait deux bonnes valeurs de sortie avec probabilité presque f .
À titre d’exemple du potentiel, en tant que primitive cryptographique, du
hachage interactif, nous démontrons des réductions eﬃcaces de String OT avec
longueur k à Bit OT et quelques unes de ses variantes plus faibles. Nos réductions
font appel à des tests dérivés du hachage interactif pour permettre à l’expéditeur
de vériﬁer l’adhésion du receveur au protocole, tout en respectant la conﬁden-
tialité de la valeur d’entrée de ce dernier. Les réductions qui en résultent font un
usage sécuritaire bien plus eﬃcace de l’entropie disponible du côte du receveur.
Pour Bit OT et la plupart de ses variantes, n = (1 + ￿)k exécutions suﬃsent,
ce qui double l’eﬃcacité de nos réductions par rapport aux meilleures réductions
qui n’utilisent pas le hachage interactif. Comme il est théoriquement impossible
d’avoir un facteur d’expansion n=k plus petit que 1, nos réductions sont en fait
asymptotiquement optimales. Elles sont aussi plus générales puisqu’elles perme-
ttent l’utilisation de toute famille universelle–2 de fonctions de hachage pour la
phase de Privacy Ampliﬁcation. Enﬁn, nous présentons une réduction directe de
String OT à Rabin OT utilisant des méthodes semblables pour obtenir un facteur
d’expansion de 2 + ￿ qui est, lui aussi, optimal.
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Introduction
An Interactive Hashing protocol allows a sender Alice to input a string w which,
in the course of the protocol, will be transmitted to a receiver Bob along with a
second output string w0 6= w. In a nutshell, the protocol should guarantee that
(any dishonest) Bob cannot guess which of w;w 0 was the original input, while at
the same time, it should ensure that at least one of the two output strings must
be chosen eﬀectively at random, and beyond (any dishonest) Alice’s control.
Interactive Hashing has found many applications in computational as well as
information-theoretic contexts. Various implementations of Interactive Hashing
appear in protocols achieving a multitude of cryptographic tasks, ranging from
zero-knowledge proofs to bit commitment and oblivious transfer [OVY93, OVY94,
NOVY98, OVY92, CCM98, DHRS04]. The versatility and wide applicability of
Interactive Hashing suggest that a more thorough investigation of this crypto-
15graphic tool is in order. This thesis sets out to present a study of Interactive
Hashing in the information-theoretic context, namely under the assumption that
any (dishonest) party may be computationally unbounded. The properties that
are typically required of Interactive Hashing protocols in this context are distilled
and formalized independently of any particular application. This application in-
dependence sets the stage for viewing Interactive Hashing as a cryptographic
primitive in its own right rather than simply as a class of sub-protocols within a
larger application, with security properties deﬁned on an ad-hoc basis according
to the speciﬁc needs of the given setting. It is our hope and belief that this
encapsulation of Interactive Hashing as a stand-alone primitive with well-deﬁned
properties will lead to a greater appreciation of its potential as a cryptographic
tool. At the same time, it will render Interactive Hashing more accessible to
designers of cryptographic protocols, who will be able to incorporate it in their
constructions as a self-contained building block with several implementations to
choose from, each with security properties that have (ideally) been independently
and rigorously scrutinized.
Regarding practicality, we demonstrate that Interactive Hashing as we deﬁned
it can be eﬃciently implemented in practice. Speciﬁcally, we prove that one of
the Interactive Hashing protocols that appeared in the literature [OVY93] in a
computational context actually satisﬁes all our information-theoretic security re-
quirements as well. Our proof of security is one of the major contributions of
this thesis, as it improves in several important ways upon a previous proof for
a slight variant of this protocol [CCM98]: besides its application-independence,
16our proof takes a diﬀerent, more natural approach to establishing that the prob-
ability of successfully cheating for any dishonest receiver is small. The resulting
upper bound on this probability is much tighter and the proof is considerably less
complicated overall.
Another major goal of this thesis is to illustrate the power of Interactive
Hashing as a cryptographic protocol. To this end, we demonstrate its applicability
to reductions between Oblivious Transfer variants [Rab81, EGL85]. In short, a
protocol for String Oblivious Transfer allows a sender Alice to send to a receiver
Bob one of two strings x0;x1. The protocol should guarantee that (honest)
Bob can receive the string of his choice xc without (dishonest) Alice being able
to obtain information about Bob’s choice bit c. On the other hand, (honest)
Alice is assured that (dishonest) Bob can receive information about exclusively
one of the two strings. Bit Oblivious Transfer can be seen as a special case of
String OT, with both strings having length 1. We show that Interactive Hashing
can lead to eﬃcient reductions of String Oblivious Transfer to Bit Oblivious
Transfer and several of its variants. The novelty of our reductions arises from tests
based on Interactive Hashing that are incorporated into well-known reductions
[BCW03, Cré87] based on Privacy Ampliﬁcation [BBR88]. These tests allow
the sender (in String OT) to query the receiver on a small subset of the bits
he received. Without compromising the honest receiver’s privacy concerning his
choice bit, these tests ensure that a dishonest receiver cannot deviate much
from the protocol without getting caught. Consequently, as our reductions need
only allow for a small potential deviation in the case of a dishonest receiver, they
17make much more eﬃcient use of the receiver’s entropy about the transmitted bits.
Compared to the best known reductions that do not use Interactive Hashing, our
reductions are at least twice as eﬃcient, and in most cases provably asymptotically
optimal. Moreover, they are more general since they can use any 2-universal family
of hash functions to perform Privacy Ampliﬁcation.
Remark: The nature of our subject matter calls for a modular presentation
of the material covered in this thesis. We thus defer a more detailed technical
treatment of all the notions and results presented above, as well as a thorough
review of prior work, to the introductory sections of Chapters 2 through 5.
1.1 Structure of this thesis
Each of the following chapters is as self-contained as possible. Chapter 2 presents
our study of Interactive Hashing in the information-theoretic context. Chapter 3
introduces the notion of Oblivious Transfer in detail and deﬁnes the variants we
will be encountering in the rest of the thesis. The reductions of String Oblivious
Transfer to Bit Oblivious Transfer and several weaker variants are the subject of
Chapter 4. Chapter 5 shows how the techniques behind the reductions of Chap-
ter 4 can be adapted to provide a direct reduction of String Oblivious Transfer
to Rabin Oblivious Transfer. The conclusion, along with a brief summary of
our results, is given in Chapter 6. Finally, a brief Appendix lists some useful
mathematical tools and notions.
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Interactive Hashing
Interactive Hashing (IH) is a cryptographic primitive that allows a sender Alice
to send a bit string w to a receiver Bob who receives two output strings, labeled
w0;w1 according to lexicographic order. The primitive guarantees that one of
the two outputs is equal to the original input. The other string is guaranteed to
be eﬀectively random, in the sense that it is chosen beyond Alice’s control, even
if she acts dishonestly. On the other hand, provided that from Bob’s point of
view w0;w1 are equiprobable inputs for Alice, the primitive guarantees that Bob
cannot guess which of the two was the original input with probability greater than
1=2. We remark that typically both outputs are also available to Alice. See Figure
2.1.
In this Chapter we provide a study of Interactive Hashing in the information
theoretic setting. We follow a modular approach, whereby we study Interactive
19Figure 2.1: Interactive Hashing: the sender Alice sends string w to Bob, who
receives two strings w0;w1, labeled according to lexicographic order. One of the
two (in our example, w0) is equal to the input string while the other is eﬀectively
randomly chosen. Bob cannot distinguish which of the two was the original input.
Hashing independently of the context of any speciﬁc application where it may
be used as a sub-protocol. Our application-independent analysis opens the way
to a better appreciation of the power of Interactive Hashing as a cryptographic
primitive in its own right.
We start by identifying and formalizing the information theoretic security prop-
erties of Interactive Hashing in Section 2.2. Then, in Section 2.3 we turn our
attention to the Interactive Hashing implementation that appeared as a sub-
protocol in [OVY93] and demonstrate that despite its simplicity, it meets all
security properties set forth in Section 2.2. Our new proof of security is an im-
portant improvement over the proof that appeared in [CCM98] where the authors
demonstrate that a slight variant of the IH protocol of [OVY93] could be securely
used in their speciﬁc scenario.
Since it does not rely on the speciﬁc context of any application, our new
proof is more general. Moreover, it is signiﬁcantly simpler and more intuitive.
Lastly, our proof establishes an easier to use and much tighter upper bound on
20the probability that the protocol fails to ensure that one of the two strings is
suﬃciently random.
2.1 Previous work
Various implementations of Interactive Hashing have appeared as sub-protocols in
the cryptographic literature, ﬁrst in computational contexts where at least one of
the participants is polynomially bounded and later also in contexts where security
is unconditional (information theoretic).
While reviewing the previous work, the reader should bear in mind that so
far, Interactive Hashing has never been presented as an independent primitive.
Instead, it only appears within the context of larger protocols achieving a variety
of diﬀerent cryptographic tasks. Not surprisingly, the properties it is expected to
have can vary signiﬁcantly from one application to the next, and thus the proof
of security in each case depends on the speciﬁc setting.
2.1.1 Uses of Interactive Hashing in computational con-
texts
Interactive Hashing ﬁrst appeared as a sub-protocol within a protocol achieving
oblivious transfer from an unbounded sender to a polynomial-time bounded re-
ceiver [OVY93]. Soon thereafter, Interactive Hashing was deployed in various
other scenarios, such as zero-knowledge proofs [OVY94] and bit commitment
schemes [OVY92, NOVY98], where at least one of the participants was compu-
21tationally bounded.
An illustrative example of its applications in such computational contexts is the
bit commitment scheme of Naor et al. [NOVY98]. We brieﬂy remind the reader
that a bit commitment scheme allows a player, Alice, to send a commitment to
a bit b of her choice to some other player Bob. The scheme should guarantee
that, on one hand, the value of b remains hidden from (dishonest) Bob until the
decommitment phase, when Alice opens the commitment and reveals the value
of b she had committed to. On the other hand, the scheme should also guarantee
that after the commitment phase, (dishonest) Alice is only able to decommit to
one value. In the bit commitment scheme of [NOVY98], Alice commits to a bit
b by choosing uniformly at random a string m 2 f0;1g
t, computing w = ￿(m)
where ￿ is a one-way permutation1, and sending the image w to Bob using
Interactive Hashing. Alice then announces a labeling of the two outputs w0;w1
such that wb = w (this labeling allows her to later decommit to the right value).
Note that b remains perfectly hidden even from a computationally unbounded2
Bob since, by the properties of Interactive Hashing, Bob cannot tell which of
w0;w1 was Alice’s original input since they are both equally likely to be the
image of Alice’s uniformly chosen string m (recall that ￿ is a permutation). At a
later time, Alice decommits to b by announcing m, namely the pre-image under ￿
of one of w0;w1. As Interactive Hashing guarantees that one of the two outputs
is chosen eﬀectively at random, cheating would imply having to invert ￿ on an
1In short, a one-way permutation ￿ has the property that it can be eﬃciently evaluated on
any input x, yet given an image y chosen uniformly at random, it is computationally infeasible
to compute the pre-image x such that ￿(x) = y, except with negligible probability.
2A computationally unbounded player can be thought of as having inﬁnite computational
power at his disposal.
22eﬀectively random string in f0;1g
t. Therefore, if ￿ is one-way, Alice can only
cheat a negligible fraction of the time. Indeed, the security of this commitment
scheme is formally proved via a reduction showing that if (polynomially-bounded)
Alice can decommit both ways a non-negligible fraction of the time, then there
exist eﬃcient algorithms that invert ￿, thereby contradicting its one-wayness.
2.1.2 Uses of Interactive Hashing in information theoretic
contexts
Beside the computational scenarios in which it was originally used, Interactive
Hashing proved to be an important tool in information theoretic contexts as well.
Its ﬁrst such use was in protocols for oblivious transfer which are information the-
oretically secure under the sole assumption that the receiver’s memory is bounded
[CCM98, ADR02, Din01, DHRS04]. Interactive Hashing was later used to op-
timize reductions between oblivious transfer variants [CS06] (see also Chapter
4).
We remark that while some of the security properties required of Interactive
Hashing in information theoretic settings bear a very close resemblance to their
counterparts in computational settings, some other properties are substantially
diﬀerent. Moreover, the transition from computational to information theoretic
settings requires a re-evaluation of all security properties of any protocol. For
this reason, starting with [CCM98], the security properties of the underlying In-
teractive Hashing sub-protocol have been re-evaluated in the light of the speciﬁc,
information theoretic context in which it was used.
232.2 Information theoretic security deﬁnition of
Interactive Hashing
We now formalize the security properties that Interactive Hashing is expected
to satisfy in information theoretic contexts3. As these properties do not depend
on any speciﬁc application, they allow us to deﬁne Interactive Hashing as an
independent cryptographic primitive.
Deﬁnition 2.1. Interactive Hashing is a cryptographic primitive between two
players, the sender and the receiver. It takes as input a string w 2 f0;1g
t from
the sender, and produces as output two t–bit strings one of which is w and the
other w0 6= w. The output strings are available to both the sender and the
receiver, and satisfy the following properties:
1. The receiver cannot tell which of the two output strings was the original
input. Let the two output strings be w0;w1, labeled according to lexico-
graphic order. Then if both strings were a priori equally likely to have been
the sender’s input w, then they are a posteriori equally likely as well4.
2. When both participants are honest, the input is equally likely to be paired
with any of the other strings. Let w be the sender’s input and let w0 be the
second output of interactive hashing. Then provided that both participants
follow the protocol, w0 will be uniformly distributed among all 2t￿1 strings
3In some speciﬁc applications, one or more of the security properties may actually be relaxed.
4Note that if we want this property to hold for all possible outputs, then w must be uniformly
chosen. Otherwise, this property will only hold whenever w happens to be paired with a string
w0 having the same a priori probability as w.
24diﬀerent from w.
3. The sender cannot force both outputs to have a rare property. Let G be
a subset of f0;1g
t representing the sender’s “good set”. Let G be the
cardinality of G and let T = 2t. Then if G=T is “small”, the probability that
a dishonest sender will succeed in having both outputs w0;w1 be in G is
comparably “small”.
Remark: In the computational contexts of Section 2.1.1, similar properties to
Properties 1 and 2 were also required. On the other hand, the computational
counterpart to Property 3 is usually stated quite diﬀerently, as there is no pre-
determined good set G. For instance, in [NOVY98] (see Section 2.1.1) where
the inputs and outputs of Interactive Hashing are interpreted as images under
a one-way permutation ￿, one of the two outputs is required to be suﬃciently
random so that any polynomial-time algorithm that can compute pre-images to
both outputs a signiﬁcant fraction of the time can be used to eﬃciently invert ￿
on a randomly chosen string with non-negligible probability.
2.3 A Protocol for Interactive Hashing and a new
proof of its security
We will be examining the implementation of Interactive Hashing given in Proto-
col 2.1. This standard implementation was originally introduced in a computa-
tional context by Ostrovsky, Venkatesan, and Yung [OVY93]. In Section 2.3 we
will see that this very simple protocol actually meets all our information theoretic
25security requirements as well.
Protocol 2.1 Interactive Hashing
Let w be a t-bit string that the sender wishes to send to the receiver. All
operations below take place in the binary ﬁeld F2.
1. The receiver chooses a (t ￿ 1) ￿ t matrix Q uniformly at random among
all binary matrices of rank t ￿ 1. Let qi be the ithquery, consisting of the
ithrow of Q.
2. For 1 ￿ i ￿ t ￿ 1 do:
(a) The receiver sends query qi to the sender.
(b) The sender responds with ci = qi ￿ w.
3. Given Q and c (the vector of Bob’s responses), both parties compute the
two values of w consistent with the linear system Q ￿ w = c. These
solutions are labeled w0;w1 according to lexicographic order.
Remark: One way of choosing the matrix Q is to choose a (t ￿1)￿t binary
matrix uniformly at random and test whether it has rank t ￿ 1, repeating the
process if necessary. Note that a later variation of the protocol [NOVY98] chose
Q in a canonical way to guarantee that it has rank t ￿ 1, which results in a
somewhat more practical implementation. However, this appears to complicate
the proof of security.
Theorem 2.1 establishes the security of Protocol 2.1.
Theorem 2.1. Protocol 2.1 satisﬁes all three information theoretic security prop-
erties of Deﬁnition 2.1. Speciﬁcally, for Property 3, it ensures that a dishonest
sender can succeed in causing both outputs to be in the “good set” G with
probability at most 15:6805 ￿ G=T.
26Theorem 2.1 follows from Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2, which we prove in Sec-
tions 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, respectively.
Lemma 2.1. Protocol 2.1 satisﬁes Properties 1 and 2 of Deﬁnition 2.1.
Lemma 2.2. Protocol 2.1 ensures that a dishonest sender can succeed in causing
both outputs to be in the “good set” G with probability at most 15:6805 ￿ G=T.
2.3.1 Satisfying Properties 1 and 2
Lemma 2.1 is rather straightforward to prove. Protocol 2.1 essentially builds the
linear system of equation (2.1) in a row-by-row manner.





::: q1 :::
::: q2 :::
. . .
. . .
. . .
::: qt￿1 :::





| {z }
Q
￿



. . .
w
. . .


 =





c1
c2
. . .
ct￿1





: (2.1)
The properties of the linear system easily establish that Property 1 of Deﬁnition
2.1 is met, in other words, that the receiver cannot guess which of the two output
strings was the sender’s original input to the protocol. Let V be the receiver’s
(marginal) view at the end of the protocol and let w0;w1 be the corresponding
output strings. Note that V would be identical whether the sender’s input was
w0 or w1, as the responses obtained after each challenge would be the same
in both cases. Consequently, if before the protocol begins the sender is equally
likely to have chosen w0 and w1 as input — both with some typically very small
probability ￿ — then at the end of the protocol, given the view V, each of these
two strings has equal probability 1=2 of having been the original input string. We
27observe that a dishonest receiver would have nothing to gain by selecting a matrix
Q of queries in a non-random fashion or by selecting a matrix with rank less than
t ￿ 1.
As for Property 2, let w be the sender’s input and let w0 be the second
output of Interactive Hashing. We ﬁrst note that since the linear system has two
distinct solutions, it is always the case that w0 6= w. To see that w0 is uniformly
distributed among all strings in f0;1g
t nw, it suﬃces to observe that Q is chosen
uniformly at random among all rank t ￿1 matrices and that the number of such
Q’s satisfying Q(w) = Q(w0) , Q(w ￿ w0) = 0 is the same5 for any w0 6= w.
2.3.2 Satisfying Property 3
The bulk of the proof is devoted to the considerably more ambitious undertak-
ing of proving Lemma 2.2 establishing that Property 3 is also met. Note that
Property 3 would be rather easy to satisfy when G 2 o(
p
T) as in this case, the
probability that a matrix Q selected uniformly at random will lead to collisions6
within G is negligible. Consequently, in this scenario there would not even be a
need for interaction since the sender could simply send the whole of Q in one
round. Interaction only becomes necessary for larger sets G for which the prob-
ability of collision becomes signiﬁcant because of the Birthday Paradox7. What
5To be more speciﬁc, to each such pair w;w0 correspond exactly
Qt￿2
i=0
 
2t￿1 ￿ 2i
matrices
Q. To see this, let v = w ￿w0. As v 6= ~ 0, the equation q ￿v = 0 has 2t￿1 solutions. A matrix
Q of rank t ￿1 satisfying Q(v) = 0 must have rows q1;:::;qt￿1 that are non-zero and linearly
independent of all previous rows.
6A collision occurs when there exist strings w0;w1 2 G such that Q ￿ w0 = Q ￿ w1. In other
words, when w0 ￿w1 = w where w is the unique non-zero solution to the equation Q(w) = ~ 0.
7According to the Birthday Paradox, it is almost certain that there will be collisions if
G 2 !(
p
T).
28we will show is that interaction in eﬀect “beats” the Birthday Paradox, in the
sense that a dishonest sender can only produce a collision in G with probability
O(G=T).
Notation
Table 2.1 presents the notation we will be using for the rest of the proof.
Remark: at the beginning of Protocol 2.1, Gi;Pi, etc. are random variables
whose exact value will only be determined at the beginning of round i. The
intended interpretation of statements such as Pi =
Gi(Gi￿1)
2 or Pi <
G2
i
2 is that
the relation holds in all executions of the protocol once the corresponding values
are fully determined. When we say that we condition on a given value of Gi,
say, the intended interpretation is that we are setting Gi to a speciﬁc value gi.
All associated variables determined at the same round (such as Pi) are then also
implicitly set to the speciﬁc values corresponding to gi, but variables such as
Gi+1, whose exact value will depend on future queries, still remain undetermined.
Alice’s cheating strategy
At the beginning of round i, Alice has Gi good strings which are then split into
G0
i ;G1
i by query qi. It is tempting to assume that the optimal cheating strategy
for Alice is to always choose the value of ci that allows her to carry the larger
of the two sets into the next round. This would simplify our analysis since it
would allow us to establish both an upper and a lower bound on the expected
size of Gi for all i. However intuitively obvious it may be, though, proving that
29Table 2.1 Notation
T = 2t The number of all strings in f0;1g
t.
G The set of Alice’s good strings at the beginning of Protocol 2.1.
We will denote its cardinality jGj by G.
2￿u The fraction of Alice’s good strings at the beginning, namely G=T.
Gi The number of Alice’s (remaining) good strings at the beginning
of round i, right before query i is sent. Note that there are G1 = G
good strings at the beginning of Protocol 2.1 and Gt good strings
at the end (after t ￿ 1 rounds). We say that a dishonest sender
succeeds in cheating if and only if Gt = 2 (i.e., if both output
strings are good).
Pi The number of pairs of good strings remaining at the beginning
of round i. Note that Pi =
Gi(Gi￿1)
2 and that a dishonest sender
succeeds in cheating if and only if Pt = 1.
G0
i ;G1
i The number of strings in Gi that are mapped to 0;1 respectively,
by query i. Note that G0
i + G1
i = Gi.
Gm
i ;Gn
i Respectively, max(G0
i ;G1
i ) and min(G0
i ;G1
i ). Note that Gm
i +
Gn
i = Gi and that Gm
i Gn
i = G0
i G1
i .
30choosing the maximum subset is indeed the optimal strategy for Alice is not that
straightforward8. To avoid this diﬃculty, we will consider an imaginary Alice
to whom we grant extra powers compared to real Alice, subject to the following
condition: after query qi splits the Gi remaining strings into two sets of cardinality
G0
i and G1
i , imaginary Alice can choose and announce either value for ci, and
must then construct a new set of good strings to be carried forward into the
next round. This new set must be of cardinality Gi+1 = max(G0
i ;G1
i ) and its
contents can be chosen arbitrarily among all strings that satisfy Equation (2.1)
up to and including the row containing qi. We remark that intuitively, it would
be in imaginary Alice’s best interest to choose the value of ci and the contents of
the set so as to maximize the probability that two good strings will remain at the
end of the protocol. However, for the purposes of our proof, we do not need to
assume anything about imaginary Alice’s actual strategy; it suﬃces to argue that
imaginary Alice is no less powerful than real Alice. This is true because whatever
strategy real Alice uses, imaginary Alice can always copy it by choosing the same
value for ci in each round, and by deﬁning the set she carries into the next round
to contain all the strings that real Alice would carry, plus some arbitrarily chosen
strings to reach the size imposed by our condition. Thus, if we were to run the
two Alices in parallel, with the same queries, then for all i, imaginary Alice’s Gi
would be a superset of real Alice’s Gi. It is easy to see that real Alice cheats only
if imaginary Alice copying real Alice’s strategy cheats.
8The structure of the subsets may have an impact on the future probability of cheating. For
example, sets consisting of linear subspaces are probably undesirable to dishonest Alice, as each
incoming query would break them into two subsets of equal cardinality. It is thus conceivable
that in some cases, the smaller subset might be preferable to the larger one.
31Therefore, real Alice is no more likely to cheat than imaginary Alice, so if we
show that any strategy followed by imaginary Alice can succeed with probability
no larger than p, the same bound will apply to any strategy followed by real Alice
as well. From this point on, we will assume that we are dealing with imaginary
Alice.
Some preliminary results
Lemma 2.3. Alice’s strategy implies the following relations for all i:
Gi ￿ 1 (2.2)
Gi ￿
G
2i￿1 (2.3)
Gi+1 = G
m
i =
Gi
2
+
s
(Gi)
2
4
￿ G0
i G1
i (2.4)
Pi+1 =
Gm
i (Gi ￿ 1) ￿ G0
i G1
i
2
(2.5)
Pi+1 ￿ Pi ￿ G
0
i G
1
i : (2.6)
Proof.
(2.2) For some i, let Gi ￿ 1. Then, as query qi separates Alice’s good strings
into those that evaluate to 0 and those that evaluate to 1 and Alice’s
strategy is to carry into the next round a subset of cardinality equal to
that of the larger set, it will necessarily be the case that Gi+1 = Gm
i ￿ 1.
Consequently, provided that G1 ￿ 1, it follows by induction that for all i
we have Gi ￿ 1.
32(2.3) It follows from Alice’s strategy that for all i, Gi+1 ￿ Gi=2. We then apply
this bound i ￿ 1 times to get from G1 = G to Gi.
(2.4) We can write (Gm
i )
2 = Gm
i (Gi￿Gn
i ) = Gm
i Gi￿Gm
i Gn
i . As Gm
i Gn
i = G0
i G1
i ,
this implies
(G
m
i )
2 ￿ GiG
m
i + G
0
i G
1
i = 0:
Equation (2.4) gives the larger of the two solutions to this quadratic equa-
tion (the smaller one would be Gn
i =
Gi
2 ￿
q
(Gi)
2
4 ￿ G0
i G1
i ).
(2.5) We have: 2Pi+1 = Gm
i (Gm
i ￿ 1) = (Gm
i )
2 ￿ Gm
i . Substituting (Gm
i )
2 =
GiGm
i ￿ G0
i G1
i we get
2Pi+1 =
 
GiG
m
i ￿ G
0
i G
1
i

￿ G
m
i = G
m
i (Gi ￿ 1) ￿ G
0
i G
1
i :
(2.6) Note that G0
i G1
i can be interpreted as the number of pairs in Pi that are
separated by query qi (one element of the pair is mapped to 0 and the
other to 1). These pairs will be separated no matter what value Alice
announces for ci. It is thus intuitively obvious that Pi+1 cannot be any
larger than Pi ￿ G0
i G1
i . For a more rigorous proof, we will prove that
33Pi ￿ G0
i G1
i ￿ Pi+1 ￿ 0. We have
2Pi ￿ 2G
0
i G
1
i ￿ 2Pi+1 = Gi(Gi ￿ 1) ￿ 2G
m
i G
n
i ￿ G
m
i (G
m
i ￿ 1)
= (G
m
i + G
n
i )(Gi ￿ 1) ￿ G
m
i (G
m
i ￿ 1) ￿ 2G
m
i G
n
i
= G
m
i (Gi ￿ 1 ￿ G
m
i + 1 ￿ 2G
n
i ) + G
n
i (Gi ￿ 1)
= ￿G
m
i G
n
i + G
n
i (Gi ￿ 1)
= G
n
i (Gi ￿ G
m
i ￿ 1)
= G
n
i (G
n
i ￿ 1)
￿ 0 since G
n
i is always a non-negative integer.
Lemma 2.4. Conditioning on a given (speciﬁc) value of Gi the expected value
of G0
i G1
i satisﬁes
E

G
0
i G
1
i j Gi

=

2t￿1
2t ￿ 2i￿1

Pi (2.7)
￿
1
2
Pi: (2.8)
Proof. Let Gi be any set having cardinality Gi. We can arbitrarily enumerate all
its strings and write
G
0
i =
Gi X
j=1
zj and G
1
i =
Gi X
j=1
nj
where zj (resp. nj) is an indicator random variable taking on the value of 1
34whenever the corresponding string in Gi is mapped to 0 (resp. 1) by query qi
(which has not been sent yet). Then we have
G
0
i G
1
i =
 
Gi X
j=1
zj
!
￿
 
Gi X
j=1
nj
!
= z1n1 + z2n2 + ￿￿￿ + zGinGi | {z }
Gi terms (A)
+z1n2 + z1n3 + ￿￿￿ + zGinGi￿1 | {z }
G2
i ￿ Gi terms (B)
=
Gi X
j=1
Gi X
k=j+1
(zjnk + zknj)
| {z }
(G2
i ￿ Gi)=2 = Pi terms
: (2.9)
The last step follows by observing that part A vanishes since 8j; zjnj = 0 and by
grouping the terms in B into the sum of Pi terms of type zjnk +zknj with k > j.
We will now show that 8j;k (j 6= k) E[zjnk + zknj] =
2t￿1
2t￿2i￿1. Note that
we are still conditioning on the same Gi. Fix j;k such that 1 ￿ j;k ￿ Gi and
j 6= k. Let wj;wk be the corresponding strings in Gi.There are two cases to
consider:
Case 1: wj;wk 6= ~ 0. Let’s count the queries that result in zjnk = 1. These
queries must satisfy

::: wj :::
::: wk :::

￿



. . .
qi
. . .


 =

0
1

: (2.10)
As wj;wk are diﬀerent and non-zero, they are linearly independent. Consequently,
there are exactly 2t￿2 solutions for qi. Note that all such solutions are linearly
independent of all previous queries. This is because both wj;wk satisfy the linear
system of Equation (2.1) up to the row containing qi￿1, which makes it impossible
35for a linearly dependent query qi to map them to diﬀerent values.
At this round there are 2t ￿ 2i￿1 valid queries qi for Bob to choose from
(since the 2i￿1 queries that are linearly dependent on q1;:::;qi￿1 are excluded).
Therefore E[zjnk] =
2t￿2
2t￿2i￿1 and by symmetry the same holds for E[zknj]. Con-
sequently by linearity of expectation we have:
E[zjnk + zknj] =
2t￿1
2t ￿ 2i￿1:
Case 2: one of wj;wk is ~ 0. Without loss of generality, suppose it is wj. Then
no query can result in zknj = 1. Let’s count the queries that produce zjnk = 1.
These must satisfy the system

::: wj :::
::: wk :::

￿



. . .
qi
. . .


 =

0
1

: (2.11)
This system has (eﬀectively) one equation with t unknowns and hence 2t￿1
solutions for qi, all of which are linearly independent of all previous queries9.
As in Case 1, Bob has 2t ￿ 2i￿1 possible values for qi to choose from, from
which it follows that E[zjnk] =
2t￿1
2t￿2i￿1. Since E[zknj] = 0, we have that again,
E[zjnk + zknj] =
2t￿1
2t ￿ 2i￿1:
9This is because as wj = ~ 0, we must have had c1 = c2 = ￿￿￿ = ci￿1 = 0 and so a linearly
dependent query would necessarily map wk to 0. For the special case of the ﬁrst round, observe
that q1 = ~ 0 (the only disallowed query) would map wk to 0.
36Combining the two cases, we see that all Pi terms in (2.9) satisfy
E[zjnk + zknj] =
2t￿1
2t ￿ 2i￿1 ￿
1
2
and so, by linearity of expectation
E

G
0
i G
1
i j Gi

=

2t￿1
2t ￿ 2i￿1

Pi ￿

1
2

Pi: (2.12)
Lemma 2.5. Using Lemma 2.4 we can establish the following bounds:
E[Gi+1 j Gi] ￿
Gi +
p
Gi
2
(2.13)
E[Pi+1 j Pi] ￿
1
4
 
1 +
2
i+1
2
p
G
!
Pi (2.14)
E[Pi+1 j Pi] ￿
1
2

2t ￿ 2i
2t ￿ 2i￿1

Pi: (2.15)
Proof. We ﬁrst remark that conditioning on a speciﬁc value of Pi (i.e. setting
Pi = p) is equivalent to conditioning on the corresponding value of Gi and vice
versa as the value of one uniquely10 determines the other.
10Gi uniquely determines Pi =
Gi(Gi￿1)
2 . On the other hand, given Pi there are two solutions
to the corresponding quadratic equation for Gi of which only the larger is valid since the smaller
one is either negative or zero, in violation of (2.2).
37(2.13) From (2.4) we have
E[G
m
i j Gi] =
Gi
2
+ E


s
(Gi)
2
4
￿ G0
i G1
i j Gi


￿
Gi
2
+
v u
u
tE
"
(Gi)
2
4
￿ G0
i G1
i j Gi
#
by Jensen’s Inequality
=
Gi
2
+
s
(Gi)
2
4
￿ E

G0
i G1
i j Gi

by linearity of expectation
￿
Gi
2
+
s
(Gi)
2
4
￿
Gi(Gi ￿ 1)
2
1
2
using (2.8)
=
Gi +
p
Gi
2
:
(2.14) Using (2.5), we get the following:
E[Pi+1 j Gi] =
1
2
E

G
m
i (Gi ￿ 1) ￿ G
0
i G
1
i j Gi

(2.16)
=
1
2
(Gi ￿ 1)E[G
m
i j Gi] ￿
1
2
E

G
0
i G
1
i j Gi

(2.17)
￿
1
2
(Gi ￿ 1)
Gi +
p
Gi
2
￿
1
2
Gi(Gi ￿ 1)
4
(2.18)
=
Gi(Gi ￿ 1)
8

1 +
2
p
Gi

(2.19)
=
1
4

1 +
2
p
Gi

Pi (2.20)
￿
1
4
 
1 +
2
i+1
2
p
G
!
Pi: (2.21)
Note that (2.17) follows by linearity of expectation, (2.18) follows from
bounds (2.2), (2.8), (2.13) while (2.21) is obtained by applying Inequality
(2.3).
38(2.15) From (2.6) we have
E[Pi+1 j Pi] ￿ Pi ￿ E

G
0
i G
1
i j Pi

= Pi ￿ Pi

2t￿1
2t ￿ 2i￿1

using (2.7)
=
1
2

2t ￿ 2i
2t ￿ 2i￿1

Pi:
Lemma 2.6. Let 1 ￿ b ￿ t ￿ 1 be a positive integer. Let R
def = 2
u￿b
2 . Then the
expected number of pairs at the end of Protocol 2.1 satisﬁes
E[Pt] ￿
G
T
￿
2
2 ￿ 2￿b ￿ R
￿2 ￿
1 Y
j=0

1 +
R
2j=2

| {z }
Y
: (2.22)
Proof. Taking expectations on both sides11 of (2.14) we get
E[Pi+1] ￿
1
4
 
1 +
2
i+1
2
p
G
!
E[Pi]
=
1
4
 
1 + 2
(i+1￿t+u)=2
E[Pi] replacing G = 2
t￿u
=
1
4
(1 + Ri)E[Pi] writing Ri
def = 2
(i+1￿t+u)=2 . (2.23)
11This can alternatively be seen as follows:
1 X
p=0
E[Pi+1 j Pi = p] ￿ Pr[Pi = p] ￿
1 X
p=0
1
4
 
1 +
2
i+1
2
p
G
!
￿ p ￿ Pr[Pi = p] )
E[Pi+1] ￿
1
4
 
1 +
2
i+1
2
p
G
!
E[Pi]:
39Similarly, taking expectations on both sides of (2.15), we get
E[Pi+1] ￿
1
2

2t ￿ 2i
2t ￿ 2i￿1

E[Pi]: (2.24)
Note that (2.23) and (2.24) are both valid upper bounds on E[Pi+1] for any i.
Note also that these two inequalities remain valid if E[Pi] on the right hand side
is replaced by any upper bound for E[Pi].
Let a = (t ￿ 1) ￿ b. Suppose that we start by sequentially applying (2.23)
a times. Then,
E[Pa+1] ￿ E[P1] ￿
1
4a
a Y
i=1
(1 + Ri)
= P1
1
4a
a Y
i=1
(1 + Ri) since E[P1] = P1
= P1 ￿
1
4a
a￿1 Y
i=0

1 +
Ra
2i=2

using Ri=Ri￿1 =
p
2
= P1 ￿
1
4a
a￿1 Y
i=0

1 +
R
2i=2

since Ra = R = 2
u￿b
2
￿ P1 ￿
1
4a
1 Y
i=0

1 +
R
2i=2

since all terms are at least 1. (2.25)
Now suppose we sequentially apply (2.24) for the last b rounds to get an upper
40bound for E[Pt] in terms of E[Pt￿b]. Then
E[Pt] ￿ E[Pt￿b] ￿
1
2b
t￿1 Y
i=t￿b

2t ￿ 2i
2t ￿ 2i￿1

= E[Pt￿b] ￿
1
2b

2t ￿ 2t￿b
2t ￿ 2t￿b￿1

2t ￿ 2t￿b+1
2t ￿ 2t￿b

:::
:::

2t ￿ 2t￿2
2t ￿ 2t￿3

2t ￿ 2t￿1
2t ￿ 2t￿2

= E[Pt￿b] ￿
1
2b

2t ￿ 2t￿1
2t ￿ 2t￿b￿1

= E[Pt￿b] ￿
1
2b

1
2 ￿ 2￿b

= E[Pa+1] ￿
1
2b

1
2 ￿ 2￿b

(2.26)
where Equation (2.26) follows from the fact that t ￿ b = a + 1. Combining
(2.25) and (2.26), we have
E[Pt] ￿ P1 ￿
1
4a
1
2b

1
2 ￿ 2￿b
 1 Y
i=0

1 +
R
2i=2

￿
G2
2
2
￿2a￿b

1
2 ￿ 2￿b
 1 Y
i=0

1 +
R
2i=2

(2.27)
= 2
2t￿2u￿1￿2a￿b

1
2 ￿ 2￿b
 1 Y
i=0

1 +
R
2i=2

(2.28)
= 2
b+1￿2u

1
2 ￿ 2￿b
 1 Y
i=0

1 +
R
2i=2

(2.29)
= 2
￿u ￿ 2 ￿ 2
b￿u

1
2 ￿ 2￿b
 1 Y
i=0

1 +
R
2i=2

=
G
T
￿ 2 ￿ R
￿2

1
2 ￿ 2￿b
 1 Y
i=0

1 +
R
2i=2

: (2.30)
41Note that for Equation (2.27) we used the fact that P1 =
G(G￿1)
2 . For Equation
(2.28) recall that G = 2t￿u. Equation (2.29) uses 2t ￿ 2a = 2b + 2 while
Equation (2.30) follows from G=T = 2￿u and R = 2
u￿b
2 .
We are now ready to prove Lemma 2.2, which, along with Lemma 2.1 estab-
lishes Theorem 2.1.
Proof of Lemma 2.2. Since Pt = 1 if the two output strings are both good
and Pt = 0 otherwise, it follows that the probability that Alice cheats satisﬁes
Pr[Pt = 1] = E[Pt]. Similarly, the upper bound on E[Pt] established by (2.22)
is also an upper bound on the probability of successful cheating. Note that any
integer value of b in (2.22) establishes a valid upper bound. We can ﬁx12 b =
du + 0:03e in which case part Y becomes a function of u only. The probability of
cheating is thus upper bounded by min(G=T ￿ Y (u);1) = G=T ￿ min(Y (u); T=G).
Recalling that G=T = 2￿u, we set
Z(u) = min(Y (u);2
u):
A graph of Z(u) (see Figure 2.2) shows that it never exceeds 15:6805. It
therefore holds that for all ratios G=T the probability that Alice cheats is upper
bounded by 15:6805 ￿ G=T.
Remark: The maximum of Z(u) cannot occur beyond the ﬁrst few peaks
depicted in Figure 2.2. To see this, recall that R = 2
u￿b
2 where b = du + 0:03e,
12This value of b was chosen with the help of at a 3-D graph of part Y of Equation (2.22).
We remind the reader that however b is chosen, it establishes a valid upper bound.
424 5 6 7 8 9
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Figure 2.2: Graph of Z(u) vs u, showing that the maximum value of Z(u) =
min(Y (u);2u) does not exceed 15:6805. This maximum is attained at the
intersection of Y (u) with 2u, occurring near u1 = 3:9709. Note that Z(u) = 2u
for u ￿ u1 while Z(u) = Y (u) for u > u1.
43while Y (u) from Equation (2.22) can be expressed as the product of two factors,
A and B, as follows:
Y (u) =
2
2 ￿ 2￿b
| {z }
A
￿R
￿2 ￿
1 Y
j=0

1 +
R
2j=2

| {z }
B
: (2.31)
Note that factor B of Equation (2.31) depends entirely on R, which, within any
interval of length 1 of u, takes on all the values in (R0;R1] where R0 = 2￿1:03=2
and R1 = 2￿0:03=2. This explains the oscillations, whose peaks are decreasing due
to the fact that A(u) is decreasing, converging to 1 as u ! 1. For any u;u0
such that u0 = u + 1, we have R0 = R while b0 = b + 1. As A(u0) < A(u) and
B(u0) = B(u), we have Y (u0) < Y (u). This shows that the maximum cannot
occur after the ﬁrst two13 peaks of the graph.
2.3.3 Contributions of our new proof
Cachin, Crépeau, and Marcil [CCM98] proved a similar property to Property 3
for a slight variant of Protocol 2.1 in the context of memory-bounded Oblivious
Transfer where again, the goal of a dishonest sender is to force both outputs of the
protocol to be from a subset G of cardinality G (out of a total T = 2t). While
their approach relies on upper-bounding the number of the sender’s remaining
good strings during the various rounds of the protocol, ours focuses instead on
13Our reasoning does not allow us to claim that the global maximum cannot occur after the
ﬁrst peak of Z(u), as is in fact the case. This is because the ﬁrst peak does not necessarily
correspond to a peak of Y (u), but might be determined by the intersection of Y (u) with 2u.
It is thus conceivable that this ﬁrst intersection is lower than the peak of Y (u) immediately
following it.
44following the evolution of the number of pairs of good strings remaining after
each round. This seems to be a more natural choice for this scenario, as there is
exactly one such pair remaining at the end of the protocol if the sender succeeds
in cheating and none otherwise (as opposed to two strings versus zero or one).
Consequently, the probability of cheating is simply equal to the expected number
of remaining pairs. Thanks to the nature of the protocol, it is relatively easy to
establish an upper bound on the expected number of remaining pairs after each
incoming query, and to keep track of its evolution through the protocol.
Our approach not only leads to a simpler and more robust proof of security,
but more importantly, it also allows us to establish a more general and much
tighter upper bound on a dishonest sender’s probability of cheating. Speciﬁcally,
it allows us to show that any strategy a dishonest sender might employ can
succeed with probability no larger than 15:6805 ￿ G=T, for all fractions G=T of
good strings. The corresponding upper bound in [CCM98] is
p
2 ￿
8 p
G=T and is
only valid provided that G=T < (16t8)
￿1. It should be noted that our upper bound
is in fact tight up to a small constant. Indeed, the probability of succeeding in
cheating using an optimal strategy is lower-bounded by the probability of getting
two good output strings when the sender chooses w 2 G as input and then acts
honestly. By Property 2 of Interactive Hashing, w is equally likely to be paired
with any of the remaining strings. It follows that the probability of w being
paired with one of the other G ￿ 1 good strings is exactly G￿1=T￿1. Assuming
that G ￿ 2, our upper bound is larger than this lower bound by a factor of at
most 15:6805￿
 
G
T
 
T￿1
G￿1

< 15:6805
 
G
G￿1

￿ 2￿15:6805. This establishes that
45our upper bound is tight up to a small constant in all cases where the possibility
of cheating exists (cheating is impossible when G < 2).
2.3.4 An alternative implementation
Ding et al. [DHRS04] make use of a new, constant-round Interactive Hashing
protocol to achieve Oblivious Transfer with a memory-bounded receiver. The
main idea behind their protocol, which requires only four rounds of interaction
(compared to t￿1 rounds in Protocol 2.1), is that if the receiver sends a random
permutation ￿ to the sender (Round 1) who then applies it to his input string
w and announces a certain number of bits of ￿(w) (Round 2), then two more
rounds suﬃce to transmit the remaining part of ￿(w) so that only 1 bit remains
undetermined: in Round 3, the receiver chooses a function g uniformly at random
from a family of 2–wise independent 2–1 hash functions, and in Round 4 the
sender announces the value of the function applied to the remaining bits of ￿(w).
The output of the Interactive Hashing protocol consists of the two possible inputs
to the permutation ￿ consistent with the values transmitted at rounds 2 and 4.
The security of this scheme is based on the observation that the permutation ￿ in
the ﬁrst round divides the (dishonest) sender’s good set G into buckets (indexed
by the bits transmitted at Round 2), so that with high probability, in each bucket
the fraction of good strings is below the Birthday Paradox threshold. This allows
regular 2–1 hashing to be used in Rounds 3 and 4 to complete the protocol.
It should be noted that since a random permutation would need exponential
space to describe, the construction resorts to almost t-wise independent permu-
46tations, which can be eﬃciently constructed and compactly described.
Unfortunately, the protocol of [DHRS04] is less general than Protocol 2.1 for
a variety of reasons: ﬁrst, its implementation requires that the two parties know a
priori an upper bound on the cardinality of the dishonest receiver’s good set G, as
this will determine the number of bits of ￿(w) announced in Round 2. Secondly,
the upper bound for the probability that Property 3 is not met is, according to
the authors’ analysis, ￿(t ￿ G=T) and only applies when G ￿ 4t. Moreover, the
protocol does not fully satisfy Property 2, but only a slight relaxation14 of it.
Lastly, the protocol is very involved, and probably prohibitively complicated to
implement in practice. We leave it as an open problem to improve upon this
construction.
2.4 A sample application
In order to illustrate the power of Interactive Hashing in information theoretic
contexts, we will consider its application to the following problem: suppose that
a sender Alice and a receiver Bob wish to implement 1-out-of-k Bit Oblivious
Transfer (more on Oblivious Transfer in later chapters), which we will denote as
 k
1

–Bit OT. For the purposes of our example, suﬃce it to say that Alice would
like to make available k randomly chosen bits to Bob, who must be able to choose
to learn any one of them, with all choices being equally likely from Alice’s point
of view. Alice is only willing to participate provided that (dishonest) Bob learns
information about exclusively one bit, while Bob must receive the assurance that
14it approximates the uniform distribution over the remaining strings within some ￿ < 2￿t.
47(dishonest) Alice cannot obtain any information about his choice. Suppose that
all that is available to Alice and Bob is an insecure version of
 k
1

–Bit OT, denoted
(k ￿ 1)–faulty
 k
1

–Bit OT, which allows honest Bob to receive (only) one bit
of his choice but might allow a dishonest Bob to learn up to k ￿ 1 bits of his
choice. Over the past few years, Crépeau and Kilian [CK] have made repeated but
unsuccessful attempts to ﬁnd a satisfactory reduction of
 k
1

–Bit OT to (k ￿1)–
faulty
 k
1

–Bit OT. Protocol 2.2 shows how Interactive Hashing makes such a
reduction almost trivial.
Remark: For simplicity, Protocol 2.2 reduces
 2
1

–Bit OT to (k ￿ 1)–faulty
 k
1

–Bit OT without any loss of generality since
 k
1

–Bit OT can in turn be re-
duced to
 2
1

–Bit OT using the well-known reduction in [BCR86]. For simplicity,
we will also assume that k is a power of 2.
It is relatively straightforward to see that when both participants are honest,
Protocol 2.2 allows Bob to obtain the bit of his choice since he knows Rd =
Ln
i=1 rici and can thus decrypt e￿ c. In case Alice is dishonest, Bob’s choice ￿ c is
perfectly hidden from her when she obtains f at Step 6. This is because at the
beginning of the protocol, Bob is equally likely to make the choices encoded by
w0 as those encoded by w1. Consequently, by Property 1 of Interactive Hashing,
given the speciﬁc outputs, the probability of either of them having been the
original input is exactly 1=2. Hence d is uniformly distributed from Alice’s point
of view and so f = d ￿ ￿ c carries no information about ￿ c. As for the case where
Bob is dishonest, we can assume that he always avails himself of the possibility
of cheating aﬀorded by (k ￿ 1)–faulty
 k
1

–Bit OT, and obtains k ￿ 1 out of k
48Protocol 2.2 Reduction of
 2
1

–Bit OT to (k ￿ 1)–faulty
 k
1

–Bit OT
Let ￿ b0; ￿ b1 and ￿ c be the inputs of Alice and Bob, respectively, for
 2
1

–Bit OT.
1. Alice and Bob agree on a security parameter n.
2. For 1 ￿ i ￿ n do:
(a) Alice selects at random bits ri1;ri2;:::;rik while Bob selects at ran-
dom ci 2R f1;:::;kg.
(b) Alice uses (k ￿1)–faulty
 k
1

–Bit OT to send her k bits to Bob, who
chooses to learn rici.
3. Bob encodes his choices during the n rounds of (k ￿1)–faulty
 k
1

–Bit OT
as a bit string w of length n ￿log(k) by concatenating the binary represen-
tations of c1;c2;:::;cn.
4. Bob sends w to Alice using Interactive Hashing. Let w0;w1 be the output
strings labeled according to lexicographic order, and let d 2 f0;1g be such
that w = wd.
5. Let p1;p2;:::;pn be the positions encoded in w0 and let q1;q2;:::;qn be
the positions encoded in w1. Alice computes
R0 =
n M
i=1
ripi R1 =
n M
i=1
riqi:
6. Bob sends f = d ￿ ￿ c to Alice.
7. Alice sends e0 = ￿ b0 ￿ Rf and e1 = ￿ b1 ￿ R￿ f to Bob.
8. Bob decodes ￿ b￿ c = e￿ c ￿ Rf ￿￿ c = e￿ c ￿ Rd.
49bits every time. Then, by the end of Step 2, it is always the case that among all
encodings of positions, only
 
k￿1
k
n
< e￿n=k are “good”, in the sense that they
represent positions that are all known to him (along with their exclusive OR). By
Property 3 of Interactive Hashing, Bob cannot force both w0 and w1 to be among
these “good” encodings except with probability no larger than 15:6805 ￿ e￿n=k.
This probability can be made arbitrarily small by an appropriate choice of the
security parameter n.
2.5 Conclusion and open problems
We have provided a rigorous deﬁnition of Interactive Hashing by distilling and for-
malizing its security properties in an information theoretic context, independently
of any speciﬁc application. This opens the way to recognizing Interactive Hashing
as a cryptographic primitive in its own right, and not simply as a sub-protocol
whose security properties, as well as their proof, depend on the speciﬁcs of the
surrounding application. We have also demonstrated that there exists a simple
implementation of Interactive Hashing that fully meets the above-mentioned se-
curity requirements, and gave a proof of correctness that signiﬁcantly improves
upon previous results in the literature. We have also provided a simple example
that oﬀers a glimpse into the power of Interactive Hashing as a cryptographic
primitive, as a preview to the more elaborate applications that we will be encoun-
tering in Chapters 4 and 5.
50Open problems The interested reader is encouraged to consider the following
open problems:
1. Devise a more appropriate name for Interactive Hashing which better cap-
tures its properties as a cryptographic primitive rather than the mechanics
of its known implementations.
2. Investigate how much interaction, if any, is really necessary in principle to
implement Interactive Hashing.
3. Explore ways to implement Interactive Hashing more eﬃciently, especially
regarding the amount of interaction. To this end, the constant-round Inter-
active Hashing protocol of [DHRS04] we brieﬂy described in Section 2.3.4 is
an important step in the right direction. We invite the interested reader to
improve on this construction so that it meets all the security requirements.
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Oblivious Transfer
Oblivious Transfer (OT) is a cryptographic primitive of paramount importance,
especially in the context of multi-party computation. One of its early variants had
been studied by Wiesner [Wie70] under the name of “multiplexing” but his work
was only published post-facto. The notion of Oblivious Transfer was introduced
to cryptography by Rabin [Rab81]. Rabin OT is a primitive that allows a sender
Alice to send a bit b to a receiver Bob who receives either b or ￿ (the erasure
symbol), each with probability 1=2. The primitive guarantees that Alice does not
learn which of the two events occurred.
Another, more frequently encountered variant of Oblivious Transfer is one out
of two Bit Oblivious Transfer [EGL85], denoted
 2
1

–Bit OT or simply Bit OT.
Here, the sender Alice sends two bits b0;b1 to Bob, who can choose to learn
the bit of his choice c, namely bc. This primitive guarantees that on one hand,
53Bob learns nothing about the other bit while on the other hand Alice doesn’t
ﬁnd out what c was. Despite the diﬀerences in appearance between Bit OT and
Rabin OT, the two variants are in fact equivalent cryptographic primitives, as was
demonstrated by Crépeau [Cré87].
The apparent simplicity of Oblivious Transfer belies its surprising power as
a cryptographic primitive. Its applicability to multi-party computation was ﬁrst
studied by Even, Goldreich and Lempel [EGL85]. Ever since, Oblivious Transfer
has featured as a main ingredient in an array of protocols implementing a large
variety of cryptographic tasks, such as bit commitment, zero-knowledge proofs,
and general secure multi-party computation [Yao86, GMW87, Gol04]. Kilian
[Kil88] demonstrated that this primitive is in and of itself suﬃcient to securely
implement any two-party computation.
String OT is a generalization of Bit OT that allows Alice to send one of
two k–bit strings to Bob. In the next two Chapters, we will see how Interactive
Hashing, which was presented in Chapter 2, enables String OT to be eﬃciently
reduced to Bit OT and other related but weaker primitives (Chapter 4), as well
as to the original Rabin OT (Chapter 5). The rest of the present chapter is
devoted to introducing the various types of Oblivious Transfers that we will later
encounter.
3.1 String OT and Bit OT
One-out-of-two String Oblivious Transfer, denoted
 2
1

–String OT
k, is a primitive
that allows a sender Alice to send one of two bit strings, x0;x1 2 f0;1g
k to a
54receiver Bob who receives xc for a choice bit c 2 f0;1g. It is assumed that the
joint probability distribution Px0x1c from which the inputs are generated is known
to both parties. The primitive oﬀers the following guarantees:
1. (Correctness) When both parties are honest, Bob obtains xc while Alice
obtains nothing.
2. (Security for Bob) Any (dishonest) Alice cannot learn any extra information
about Bob’s choice c beyond what can be inferred from her inputs x0;x1
and the distribution Px0x1c.
3. (Security for Alice) Any (dishonest) Bob can learn information concerning
exclusively one of x0;x1. This excludes any joint information about the two
strings except what can be inferred from Bob’s input, (legitimate) output,
and Px0x1c.
Bit OT can then simply be viewed as a special case of
 2
1

–String OT
k with
k = 1.
3.2 Weaker variants of Bit OT
XOR OT1, Generalized OT and Universal OT are weaker variants of
 2
1

–Bit OT
obtained by relaxing the security guarantees against a dishonest receiver (Bob), as
1As a brief historical aside, we mention that XOR OT was originally studied in the context of
reversing the direction of Oblivious Transfer. Crépeau and Sántha [CS91] showed that it is very
easy to obtain XOR OT in one direction if
 2
1

–Bit OT in the reverse direction is available. Using
their approach, obtaining
 2
1

–Bit OT itself required a more elaborate construction involving
several executions of
 2
1

–Bit OT in the reverse direction. These results were obviated by a
more recent approach [WW06] that fully reverses
 2
1

–Bit OT using just one execution.
55described below. Note that in all cases, b0;b1 denote Alice’s input bits. Whatever
extra choices may be available to Bob, he always has the option of acting honestly
to obtain bc for a choice c 2 f0;1g. As in “regular”
 2
1

–Bit OT, Alice never
obtains information about Bob’s choice c, or learns whether Bob actually made
use of his expanded choices.
XOR OT (XOT) Bob can choose to learn one of b0;b1;b￿ where b￿
def = b0￿b1.
Generalized OT (GOT) Bob can choose to learn f (b0;b1) where f is any of
the 16 possible one-bit functions of b0;b1.
Universal OT (UOT) Bob can choose to learn ￿(b0;b1) where ￿ is any arbi-
trary discrete memoryless channel whose input is a pair of bits and whose
output satisﬁes the following information theoretic constraint: let B0;B1 2
f0;1g be uniformly distributed random variables and let ￿ ￿ 1 be a con-
stant. Then,
H(B0;B1 j ￿(B0;B1)) ￿ ￿:
Note that we do not consider channels with ￿ > 1 as this would disallow Bob to
act honestly.
3.3 Rabin OT
In this incarnation of Oblivious Transfer, which, as already noted, was the ﬁrst
one to appear in the cryptographic literature [Rab81], the sender Alice sends a bit
b to the receiver Bob over an erasure channel with erasure probability 1=2 and is
56then oblivious to what transpired during the transmission. In Chapter 5 where we
deal with this variant of OT, we will only be concerned with the case where the
bits sent by Alice are chosen independently and uniformly at random. In other
words, as the bits are uncorrelated with any information that Bob might have in
his possession, whenever he receives the erasure symbol ￿, he cannot guess thee
value of b with probability greater than 1=2.
3.4 Randomized OT
 2
1

–ROT
k is a randomized variant of
 2
1

–String OT
k where Alice makes avail-
able to Bob two strings r0;r1 2 f0;1g
k chosen uniformly at random and inde-
pendently. Bob learns rc for a randomly chosen c 2R f0;1g. The fact that the
inputs are random and uncorrelated greatly simpliﬁes the security requirements
of
 2
1

–ROT
k. Speciﬁcally, this primitive oﬀers the following guarantees:
1. (Correctness) When both parties are honest, Bob obtains rc while Alice
obtains nothing.
2. (Security for Bob) Bob’s choice bit c is uniformly distributed in (dishonest)
Alice’s view.
3. (Security for Alice) Any (dishonest) Bob can learn information concerning
exclusively one of r0;r1. Speciﬁcally, at the end of every execution there
must exist some c0 2 f0;1g such that, given (dishonest) Bob’s view as
well as rc0 (provided by an oracle), r￿ c0 is uniformly distributed in f0;1g
k.
57Despite its simplicity,
 2
1

–ROT
k is in fact equivalent to
 2
1

–String OT
k. In-
tuitively, it is easy to see that
 2
1

–ROT
k reduces to
 2
1

–String OT
k. Protocol 3.1
shows that there exists a straightforward reduction in the reverse direction as well.
For a more formal proof of the equivalence of these two variants, see Section 3.5.3.
Protocol 3.1 Reduction of String OT to Randomized OT
Let the inputs to
 2
1

–String OT
k be x0;x1 2 f0;1g
k for the sender and c 2
f0;1g for the receiver.
1. The sender uses
 2
1

–ROT
k to send ￿ r0;￿ r1 2R f0;1g
k to the receiver, who
receives ￿ r￿ c for some randomly chosen ￿ c 2 f0;1g.
2. The receiver sends d = c ￿ ￿ c to the sender.
3. The sender sets e0 = x0 ￿ ￿ rd and e1 = x1 ￿ ￿ r ￿ d and sends e0;e1 to the
receiver.
4. The receiver decodes xc = ec ￿￿ r￿ c.
Remark: Step 1 can be performed before the two parties’ inputs to  2
1

–String OT
k have been determined and its results stored for later use.
The simplicity of
 2
1

–ROT
k compared to
 2
1

–String OT
k makes it consider-
ably easier to work with. For this reason, in Chapters 4 and 5 where our goal
is to provide eﬃcient reductions of
 2
1

–String OT
k to other Oblivious Trans-
fer variants, we actually resort to reductions of
 2
1

–ROT
k, without any loss of
generality.
583.5 Information-theoretic deﬁnitions of OT
Although the formulation of the properties of
 2
1

–String OT
k is quite intuitive
and rather straightforward even for the general case where the inputs of the
two parties may be correlated, a corresponding formal deﬁnition in the language
of information theory is rather elusive. Indeed, over the past decades, several
attempts have been made to capture the security properties of
 2
1

–String OT
k
in such an information theoretic deﬁnition. Most of the resulting deﬁnitions
are either too restrictive in scope and thus applicable to only a few specialized
scenarios, or suﬀer from subtle (and sometimes not so subtle) ﬂaws. An overview
of some of these deﬁnitions and their shortcomings appears in [CSSW06], along
with a new information theoretic deﬁnition of
 2
1

–String OT
k which is shown
to be equivalent to a widely accepted security deﬁnition of general two-party
computation in the real/ideal model paradigm and will thus hopefully stand the
test of time.
We present this new deﬁnition of
 2
1

–String OT
k in Section 3.5.1 and its
counterpart for
 2
1

–ROT
k in Section 3.5.2. Finally, in Section 3.5.3 we pro-
vide a formal proof establishing that
 2
1

–String OT
k and
 2
1

–ROT
k are indeed
equivalent using these deﬁnitions.
3.5.1 Deﬁnition of
 2
1

–String OT
k
In what follows, X = X0X1 is a random variable denoting the sender’s input, C
is a random variable denoting the receiver’s choice bit and Z is a random variable
denoting the environment. U;V are random variables denoting the outputs of the
59sender and receiver, respectively.
Theorem 3.1 ([CSSW06]). A protocol between Player 1 and Player 2 securely
computes
 2
1

–String OT
k perfectly if and only if for every pair of algorithms
A = (A1;A2) such that at least one of A1;A2 follows the protocol, and for all
inputs (X;C) and auxiliary input Z, A produces outputs2 (U;V ) such that the
following conditions are satisﬁed:
1. (Correctness) If both players are honest, then (U;V ) = (?;XC).
2. (Security for Player 1) If Player 1 (the sender) is honest, then we have
U = ? and there exists a random variable C0, such that
I(X;C
0 j ZC) = 0 and I(X;V j ZCC
0XC0) = 0:
3. (Security for Player 2) If Player 2 (the receiver) is honest, then we have
I(C;U j ZX) = 0:
3.5.2 Deﬁnition of
 2
1

–ROT
k
We provide an information theoretic deﬁnition of
 2
1

–ROT
k along the lines of
Theorem 3.1. Let R0;R1 2 f0;1g
k be two uniformly distributed, independently
chosen random variables corresponding to Alice’s input and let R = R0R1. Let
C 2 f0;1g be a binary, uniformly distributed random variable corresponding
2We remark that the output of a dishonest party can, without loss of generality, be assumed
to contain the party’s marginal view of the protocol’s execution.
60to Bob’s choice bit. Theorem 3.2 captures the information theoretic security
requirements for
 2
1

–ROT
k.
Theorem 3.2. A protocol between Player 1 and Player 2 securely computes
 2
1

–ROT
k perfectly if and only if, for every pair of algorithms A = (A1;A2)
such that at least one of A1;A2 follows the protocol, and for randomly and
independently chosen inputs (R;C) and auxiliary input Z, A produces outputs
(U;V ) such that the following conditions are satisﬁed:
1. (Correctness) If both players are honest, then (U;V ) = (?;RC).
2. (Security for Player 1) If Player 1 (the sender) is honest, then we have
U = ? and there exists a random variable C0, such that
I(R;C
0 j ZC) = 0 and H(R ￿ C0 j ZCC
0RC0V ) = k:
3. (Security for Player 2) If Player 2 (the receiver) is honest, then we have
H(C j ZRU) = 1 :
Intuitively, Theorem 3.2 guarantees that from the point of view of any dis-
honest receiver, one of R0;R1 is uniformly distributed, even if the other string
is provided to the receiver by an oracle (this ensures that no joint information is
available). In other words, there exists some C0, which must not depend on R,
such that H(R ￿ C0) = k after conditioning on RC0 and all information available
to the receiver. Likewise, from the point of view of a dishonest sender, C is
61uniformly distributed, namely H(C) = 1, given all available information.
3.5.3 Equivalence of
 2
1

–String OT
k and
 2
1

–ROT
k
In this section we show that
 2
1

–ROT
k can be implemented using
 2
1

–String OT
k
and vice versa.
Reducing
 2
1

–ROT
k to
 2
1

–String OT
k
Lemma 3.1. If a
 2
1

–String OT
k Protocol satisfying the security conditions of
Theorem 3.1 is used with uniformly and independently chosen inputs (R = R0R1
and C for the sender and receiver, respectively), then the security conditions of
Theorem 3.2 will also be met.
Proof. It is easy to see that if both players are honest and the protocol for
 2
1

–String OT
k satisﬁes Condition 1 of Theorem 3.1, then it also satisﬁes Condi-
tion 1 of Theorem 3.2. As for Condition 2 of Theorem 3.2, we ﬁrst observe that
there exists C0 such that I(R;C0 j ZC) = 0 since the corresponding condition in
Theorem 3.1 guarantees it. Moreover, since it holds that I(R;V j ZCC0RC0) = 0,
we have
H(R j ZCC
0RC0V ) = H(R j ZCC
0RC0) (3.1)
which implies that
H(R ￿ C0 j ZCC
0RC0V ) +
=0 z }| {
H(RC0 j ZCC
0RC0R ￿ C0V ) =
H(RRC0 j ZCC
0) ￿ H(RC0 j ZCC
0):
(3.2)
62From (3.2) it follows that
H(R ￿ C0 j ZCC
0RC0V ) = H(R j ZCC
0) ￿ H(RC0 j ZCC
0)
= H(R j ZC) ￿ H(RC0 j ZC) (3.3)
= 2k ￿ k (3.4)
= k:
Note that 3.3 follows from I(R;C0 j ZC) = 0 while 3.4 is follows from the fact
that R0;R1 2 f0;1g
k are chosen uniformly at random and independently of ZC.
Finally, for Condition 3 (protecting the honest receiver from a dishonest
sender), observe that the corresponding condition for
 2
1

–String OT
k guaran-
tees that I(C;U j ZR) = 0 =) H(C j ZRU) = H(C j ZR) = 1 since C is
chosen uniformly at random and independently of ZR.
Reducing
 2
1

–String OT
k to
 2
1

–ROT
k
Lemma 3.2 proves the security of the reduction of
 2
1

–String OT
k to
 2
1

–ROT
k
presented in Protocol 3.1.
Note on notation: In order to make the distinction between the variables for
 2
1

–String OT
k and
 2
1

–ROT
k, we will place a small circle above all the latter
ones, whether they have a similarly-named counterpart in
 2
1

–String OT
k or not.
Lemma 3.2. If the
 2
1

–ROT
k subprotocol used in Protocol 3.1 satisﬁes the con-
ditions of Theorem 3.2, then the conditions of Theorem 3.1 for
 2
1

–String OT
k
63are also met.
Proof. Let ￿ R = ￿ R0￿ R1 and ￿ C be random variables corresponding to the two
parties’ random inputs for the
 2
1

–ROT
k subprotocol. Let ￿ U; ￿ V be the two
parties’ outputs, and let ￿ Z be the auxiliary string (which honest parties always
ignore). Similarly, let X = X0X1 and C be the two parties’ respective inputs to
the String OT protocol and let U;V be the corresponding outputs. Let D = C￿￿ C
and let E0 = X0 ￿ ￿ RD, E1 = X1 ￿ ￿ R ￿ D. Let Z be the auxiliary string denoting
the environment. Since no new auxiliary information is made available during
Protocol 3.1, we will assume that Z = ￿ Z.
Condition 1 If the
 2
1

–ROT
k subprotocol satisﬁes Condition 1 then it is easy to
see that Condition 1 for
 2
1

–String OT
k will also be met. Indeed, in Step 2
the receiver sends to the sender a “ﬂip bit” d which eﬀectively allows him to
invert the order in which the input strings of
 2
1

–String OT
k are encrypted
and thus to eventually output the string xc of his choice regardless of his
initial random choice of ￿ c in Step 1. Clearly, the honest sender will not
output anything. Therefore, (U;V ) = (?;XC).
Condition 2 We ﬁrst note that indeed, if the sender is honest then U = ￿ U = ?.
For the subprotocol, there must exist a random variable ￿ C0 such that
I(￿ R; ￿ C0 j ￿ Z￿ C) = 0. Let C0 = ￿ C0 ￿ D. Note that by Step 2 when ￿ C;D
have been determined, the (honest) sender has not made any use of his
input X. As only the value of C, which is known to the dishonest receiver
at the beginning of the protocol, could have inﬂuenced Steps 1 and 2, it
64must be the case that C0 contains no information about X beyond what is
already included in C and thus I(X;C0 j ZC) = 0.
We now need to show that I(X;V j ZCC0XC0) = 0 or equivalently, that
H(X ￿ C0 j ZCC
0XC0) = H(X ￿ C0 j ZCC
0XC0V ):
Notice that the dishonest receiver’s output (or view) V can, without loss
of generality, be assumed to be V = ￿ V E0E1 = ￿ V EC0E ￿ C0. It is clear that
I(￿ V ;X j C) = 0 since ￿ V is unrelated to X given C. Since we condition
on XC0, EC0 adds no further information on X. As for E ￿ C0, it corresponds
to X ￿ C0 after encryption using ￿ RD￿ ￿ C0 = ￿ R ￿ ￿ C0 as a one-time pad. Since it
holds that H

￿ R ￿ ￿ C0 j ￿ Z￿ C ￿ C0￿ R￿ C0￿ V

= k, by the properties of the one-time
pad no information about X ￿ C0 is made available through E ￿ C0. It follows
that H(X ￿ C0 j ZCC0XC0V ) = H(X ￿ C0 j ZCC0XC0).
Condition 3 The only information made available to the dishonest sender after
Step 1 is the value of D. We can thus assume that U = ￿ UD. Since
D = C ￿ ￿ C and H
 
￿ C j ￿ Z￿ R￿ U

= 1, D contains no information about C.
Since X is available to the dishonest sender at the beginning of Protocol
3.1, it is conceivable that the subprotocol was inﬂuenced by X. However,
￿ U cannot carry any information beyond X since the honest receiver never
made any use of C during the
 2
1

–ROT
k subprotocol. It follows that
I(C;U j ZX) = 0.
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Reducing String OT to Bit OT variants
As mentioned in Chapter 3,
 2
1

–Bit OT is by itself suﬃcient to securely implement
any two-party computation [Kil88]. It should thus not come as a surprise that
 2
1

–String OT
k can be reduced to
 2
1

–Bit OT, at least in principle. However, as
such generic reductions are typically ineﬃcient and impractical, many attempts
at ﬁnding direct and eﬃcient reductions have been made in the past. Besides
increasing eﬃciency, an orthogonal goal of some of these reductions has been to
reduce
 2
1

–String OT
k to weaker variants of Bit OT such as XOR OT, General-
ized OT and Universal OT. As we shall see in this Chapter, Interactive Hashing
can supplement some of the techniques used in reductions of
 2
1

–String OT
k to
the above-mentioned variants. This gives rise to enhanced reductions that are
both more eﬃcient — in fact, most of them can be proved to be asymptotically
optimal — and more general than reductions that do not make use of Interac-
67tive Hashing [CS06]. Note that as
 2
1

–ROT
k and
 2
1

–String OT
k are equivalent
(see Section 3.5.3), without loss of generality, our goal in this Chapter and the
next will be to present reductions of
 2
1

–ROT
k to Bit OT and its variants. This
choice is motivated by the fact that the randomized nature of
 2
1

–ROT
k and the
independence of the two parties’ inputs yield simpler constructions with easier to
prove security.
4.1 Previous work
All reductions of
 2
1

–ROT
k to Bit OT fall within two major categories: reductions
based on Self-intersecting Codes [BCS96] (Section 4.1.1) and reductions based
on Privacy Ampliﬁcation [BBR88] (Section 4.1.2).
4.1.1 Reductions based on Self-intersecting Codes
Self-intersecting Codes are a special class of error-correcting codes encoding k-bit
input strings into n-bit codewords. They have the extra property that any two
non-zero codewords c0;c1 always have at least one non-zero position in common.
In other words, there exist some position i such that ci
0ci
1 6= 0. This property
turns out to be relevant to Oblivious Transfer, since it can be shown that it
guarantees that if I is the set of n positions and v0;v1 are any two disjoint
subsets of I, then there exists d 2 f0;1g such that the following always holds
about vd: if R 2 f0;1g
n is randomly chosen among all encodings that decode to
any speciﬁc r 2 f0;1g
k, then announcing the bits of R at positions vd provides
no information at all about r.
68Consequently, to achieve
 2
1

–ROT
k, the sender Alice ﬁrst selects two random
strings R0;R1 from f0;1g
n, which are decoded into r0;r1 2 f0;1g
k by the code.
Alice sends R0;R1 pairwise through n executions of Bit OT to the receiver Bob.
If Bob is honest, he will receive Rc for some choice bit c, which he can then
easily decode into rc. On the other hand, if Bob is dishonest he will receive the
bits of R0 at positions v0 and the bits of R1 at positions v1 with v0 \v1 = ;. By
the properties of the code, then, he learns nothing about rd for some d 2 f0;1g.
Note that this would remain true even if Bob were given r ￿ d by an oracle.
Advantages and Disadvantages
The main advantage of these reductions is that the self-intersecting code can be
chosen ahead of time and embedded once and for all in the protocol for future
use. One of the main disadvantages is the rather large expansion factor n=k, the-
oretically lower-bounded by 3:5277 [Sti99] and in practice ranging from roughly
4:8188 to 18 depending on the type of code. Another important limitation is
that this approach does not lend itself to generalizations to weaker forms of Bit
OT, such as XOT, GOT and UOT.
For more information on Self-intersecting Codes and their use in String OT
reductions we refer the reader to [BCS96].
4.1.2 Reductions based on Privacy Ampliﬁcation
Privacy Ampliﬁcation [BBR88] is a technique that allows a partially known string
to be hashed to a shorter string about which almost nothing is known. This
69shorter string can then be used in cryptographic contexts where guaranteeing
an (almost) uniform distribution from the point of view of an eavesdropper or
adversary is crucial as, for example, in the case where the string is to be used as
a one-time pad. For more information on Privacy Ampliﬁcation, see Section A.3.
In Protocol 4.1 we introduce the construction of [BCW03] upon which our
own construction (Protocol 4.2) builds and expands using Interactive Hashing.
Protocol 4.1 Reduction of
 2
1

–ROT
k to Bit OT
1. Alice selects R0, R1 2R f0;1g
n. Bob selects c 2R f0;1g.
2. Alice sends R0;R1 to Bob using n executions of Bit OT, where the ithround
contains bits Ri
0;Ri
1. Bob receives Ri
c.
3. Let k = n=2 ￿ s where s is a security parameter. Alice randomly chooses
two k ￿ n binary matrices M0;M1 of rank k and sets r0 = M0 ￿ R0 and
r1 = M1 ￿ R1.
4. Alice sends M0;M1 to Bob, who sets rc = Mc ￿ Rc.
It is easy to see that when both parties are honest, Protocol 4.1 always
succeeds in achieving
 2
1

–ROT
k. The properties of Bit OT guarantee that (dis-
honest) Alice cannot obtain any information on Bob’s choice bit c at Step 2. On
the other hand, at the end of Step 2, (dishonest) Bob is guaranteed to be missing
at least n=2 bits of Rd for some d 2 f0;1g. This is exploited at Step 3 by using
matrices M0;M1 as hash functions to perform Privacy Ampliﬁcation with output
length k = n=2 ￿ s. This guarantees that rd is uniformly distributed in f0;1g
k
and independent of r ￿ d except with probability exponentially small in the security
parameter s. Quite importantly, this property remains true even if Bit OT is
70replaced with weaker variants such as XOR OT, Generalized OT and Universal
OT — albeit at the cost of having to further reduce the size of k in the last two
cases.
Advantages and disadvantages
Besides its apparent simplicity and straightforward implementation, the reduc-
tion of Protocol 4.1 has two main advantages over reductions based on Self-
intersecting Codes:
1. Using n executions of Bit OT one can achieve
 2
1

–ROT
k for k slightly less
than n=2. This translates into an expansion factor n=k of 2 + ￿, which is
smaller than that of any reduction based on Self-intersecting Codes.
2. Using the 2-universal family of Hash Functions deﬁned at Step 3, the re-
duction works without any modiﬁcation when Bit OT is replaced with XOT
and requires only a decrease in the size of k to work with GOT and UOT.
The construction suﬀers from two disadvantages:
1. The proof of security relies heavily on the properties of matrices in F2 that
are used as hash functions for Privacy Ampliﬁcation in Step 3. A general
result for any universal class of hash functions was left as an open problem.
2. In every run of the protocol a new set of matrices M0;M1 must be selected
and transmitted, thereby increasing the amount of randomness needed as
well as the communication complexity by ￿(n2) bits.
714.2 Reduction of
 2
1

–ROT
k to
 2
1

–Bit OT using
Interactive Hashing
We now demonstrate how Interactive Hashing allows us to augment Protocol 4.1
of [BCW03] with tests that check the receiver’s adherence to the protocol. As
we shall see, these tests limit a dishonest receiver’s ability to deviate from the
protocol, thus allowing our reduction to be about twice as eﬃcient in terms of
the expansion factor n=k, without any appreciable sacriﬁce of security.
4.2.1 Preliminaries
Encoding of Subsets as Bit Strings
Let x be a very small positive constant. In our reductions we will need to encode
subsets of xn elements out of a total of n as bit strings. Let K =
  n
xn

be the
number of such subsets. There exists a simple and eﬃciently computable bĳec-
tion between the K subsets and the integers 0;:::;K￿1, providing an encoding
scheme with output length m = dlog(K)e ￿ nH(x). See [CCM98] (Section
3.1) for details on its implementation. Note that in this encoding scheme, the
bit strings in f0;1g
m that correspond to valid encodings, namely the binary rep-
resentations of numbers 0;:::;K ￿ 1, could potentially make up only slightly
more than half of all strings. In order to avoid having to deal with invalid en-
codings (which could cause the parties to abort the protocol), we modify the
encoding of [CCM98] so that any string w 2 f0;1g
m encodes the same subset
72as w (mod K), which is always a valid encoding in the original scheme1. Thus
in our modiﬁed encoding scheme each string in f0;1g
m is a valid encoding of
some subset, while to each of the K subsets correspond either 1 or 2 bit strings
in f0;1g
m. This imbalance2 in the number of encodings per subset will turn out
to be of little importance in our scenario thanks to Lemma 4.1 below.
Lemma 4.1. Assume the modiﬁed encoding of Section 4.2.1 mapping subsets
to bit strings in f0;1g
m. If the fraction of subsets possessing a certain property
is f , then the fraction f 0 of bit strings in f0;1g
m that map to subsets possessing
that property satisﬁes f 0 ￿ 2f .
Proof. Let P be the set containing all subsets possessing the property, and let
Q be its complement. Then f =
jPj
jPj+jQj. The maximum fraction of strings in
f0;1g
m mapping to subsets in P occurs when all subsets in P have two encodings
each, while all subsets in Q have only one. Consequently, f 0 ￿
2jPj
2jPj+jQj ￿
2jPj
jPj+jQj = 2f .
Notation and conventions
In the reduction of Protocol 4.2, two randomly chosen strings T0;T1 2R f0;1g
n
are transmitted pairwise using n executions of Bit OT. We denote by ti
0;ti
1 the
1An alternative would be to reduce the fraction of invalid encodings to an arbitrarily small
fraction by adding redundancy to the encoding. Indeed, as was shown in [DHRS04], at the
modest cost of increasing the encoding length from m to m + ‘, one can guarantee that the
proportion invalid encodings is no larger than 2￿‘. While this scheme does not completely
eliminate invalid encodings, it has the advantage of assigning an equal number of encodings to
each subset.
2We remark that the imbalance could be further reduced, if necessary, at the cost of a slight
increase in the encoding length. Let M ￿ m and let every w 2 f0;1g
M map to the same
subset as w (mod K). Then each of the K subsets will have at least b2M
K c and at most
l
2M
K
m
diﬀerent encodings.
73bits at position i of T0;T1, respectively. Let I be the set of all n positions. For a
subset s ￿ I let T(s) be the substring of T consisting of the bits at all positions
i 2 s in increasing order of position. Note that T(I) = T. Subsets of I of
cardinality xn will be mapped to bit strings of length m =
l
log
  n
xn
m
using
the encoding/decoding scheme of Section 4.2.1. Let w 2 f0;1g
m be such a bit
string, encoding a subset s. We will let T(w) denote the same substring as T(s).
4.2.2 The reduction
Protocol 4.2 presents our reduction of
 2
1

–ROT
k to
 2
1

–Bit OT.
Intuition behind Protocol 4.2
At Step 1, the two parties agree on the value of x, namely the proportion among
the n bit positions that will be sacriﬁced for tests. This also determines the
encoding length m for subsets of xn positions. At Step 2, Alice selects the two
random n-bit strings that are to be transmitted to Bob using n executions of
Bit OT. At Step 3, Bob randomly chooses his choice bit c 2 f0;1g. He also
selects a small subset s ￿ I of cardinality xn. The selection is made by ﬁrst
choosing an encoding w uniformly at random in f0;1g
m and then mapping it to
the corresponding subset s. This ensures that all strings in f0;1g
m are equally
likely to be Bob’s initial choice w, a fact which will become important at Step 5
when w is sent to Alice using Interactive Hashing. Note that s is not uniformly
chosen, as some subsets might have two encodings in f0;1g
m while others only
have one. Nonetheless, as we shall see, it is random enough for our needs. At
74Protocol 4.2 Reduction of
 2
1

–ROT
k to Bit OT using IH
1. Alice and Bob select x to be a (typically very small) positive constant
less than 1. They let m =
l
log
  n
xn
m
be the encoding length for the
encoding scheme of Section 4.2.1.
2. Alice chooses two random strings T0;T1 2R f0;1g
n.
3. Bob chooses a random c 2R f0;1g. Bob selects w 2R f0;1g
m uniformly
at random and decodes w into a subset s ￿ I of cardinality xn.
4. Alice transmits T0;T1 to Bob using n executions of Bit OT, with round i
containing bits ti
0;ti
1. Bob chooses to learn ti
c if i = 2 s and ti
￿ c if i 2 s.
5. Bob sends w to Alice using Interactive Hashing (Protocol 2.1). Alice and
Bob compute the two output strings, labeled w0, w1 according to lexi-
cographic order, as well as the corresponding subsets s0;s1 ￿ I. Bob
computes b 2 f0;1g s.t. wb = w.
6. Alice checks that js0 \ s1j ￿ 2x2n and aborts otherwise.
7. Both parties compute s0
0 = s0 n (s0 \ s1) and s0
1 = s1 n (s0 \ s1).
8. Bob announces a = b￿c to Alice. He also announces T0(s0
1￿a) and T1(s0
a).
9. Alice checks that the strings announced by Bob are consistent with a and
contain no errors. Otherwise she aborts the protocol.
10. Alice and Bob discard the bits at positions s0 [ s1 and concentrate on the
remaining positions in J = In(s0 [ s1). Let j = jJj and R0 = T0(J);R1 =
T1(J).
11. Alice chooses two functions h0;h1 randomly and independently from a 2-
universal family of hash functions with input length j and output length
k = j ￿ 6xn ￿ n ￿ 8xn. She sends h0;h1 to Bob and sets r0 = h0(R0)
and r1 = h1(R1).
12. Bob sets rc = hc(Rc).
75Step 4, Alice transmits T0;T1 in pairs, using n executions of Bit OT. Bob selects
to learn ti
c at all positions except at the few positions in s where his choice is
reversed. As a result he knows most bits of Tc and only xn bits of T￿ c. This is
depicted in Figure 4.1.
The goal of the protocol at Step 5 (see Figure 4.2) is to select a second,
eﬀectively random subset. Bob starts by sending w to Alice using Interactive
Hashing, the output of which will be w0;w1 with wb = w. As both strings
are equally likely to have been Bob’s original choice at Step 3, Property 1 of
Interactive Hashing guarantees that from (dishonest) Alice’s point of view, the
value of b is uniformly distributed. At the same time, Property 3 guarantees that
the choice of one of w0;w1 was eﬀectively random and beyond (dishonest) Bob’s
control. We will see that this implies that among the corresponding subsets,
s0;s1, which will be used for tests at Step 9, one is random enough to ensure
that a dishonest Bob who deviates “too much” from the protocol will get caught
with overwhelming probability.
At Step 6, Alice makes sure that the intersection of s0;s1 is not too large as
this would interfere with the proof of security against a dishonest Bob. At Step 7,
the two parties exclude the bit positions contained in the intersection from the
tests that will follow since Bob cannot be expected to know both T0(s0\s1) and
T1(s0 \ s1). What remains of s0;s1 is denoted s0
0;s0
1. At Step 8, (honest) Bob
announces Tc(s0
￿ b) and T￿ c(s0
b). Note that he can do so since s0
￿ b \s = ; and so he
knows all of Tc(s0
￿ b). As for T￿ c(s0
b), it is also known to him since s0
b ￿ s. Observe
that the only information related to c which is implied by the choice of which
76substrings to announce is the value of a, which is already made available to Alice
at the beginning of this step. Alice can thus correctly guess c = a￿b if and only
if she can correctly guess b which, as mentioned above, is uniformly distributed
given her view. At Step 9, Alice checks that the strings were announced correctly
and are consistent with the value of a — see Figure 4.3. If that is the case then
Alice is convinced that Bob has not deviated much from the protocol at Step 4.
In a nutshell, the idea here is that Interactive Hashing guarantees that even if Bob
behaves dishonestly, at least one of s0;s1 — say, without loss of generality, s1
— was chosen eﬀectively at random. Therefore, if Bob can announce all bits in
T0(s0
0);T1(s0
1), it must have been the case that he knew most bits in T1 to begin
with and consequently few bits in T0. In fact, we prove that if (dishonest) Bob
learns more than 5xn bits of both T0 and T1 during Step 4 then he gets caught at
this Step with overwhelming probability during these tests. At Step 10, the two
players discard the bits at positions s0[s1 that were used for tests and concentrate
on the remaining j positions. Note that j ￿ n￿2xn. As Bob passed the tests of
Step 9, Alice is convinced that for some d 2 f0;1g, Bob knows at most 5xn bits
of Td and thus at most 5xn bits of Rd. This implies that he is missing at least
j ￿5xn bits of Rd. At Step 11, she thus sets k = (j ￿5xn)￿xn ￿ n￿8xn and
performs Privacy Ampliﬁcation (with security parameter xn) on R0;R1 to get
r0;r1. See Figure 4.4. At Step 12, honest Bob obtains the string of his choice
by applying the appropriate hash function to Rc, which is known to him entirely.
77Figure 4.1: During the n Bit OT executions Bob chooses ti
c at positions i 2 Ins,
and ti
￿ c at positions i 2 s. In the Figure, c = 0 so in the end Bob knows T0(I ns)
and T1(s). Note that while s ￿ I is shown here as a contiguous block, in reality
the positions it represents occur throughout the n executions.
Figure 4.2: Honest Bob uses Interactive Hashing to send the encoding w of his
subset s to Alice. Alice does not know which of the two outputs was Bob’s input
w. These two outputs correspond to subsets s0;s1 of which one is s and the
other is eﬀectively randomly chosen. The intersection of s0;s1 is later excluded
to form s0
0;s0
1.
78Figure 4.3: After establishing sets s0
0;s0
1, Alice expects Bob to announce either
T0(s0
0) and T1(s0
1) or T0(s0
1) and T1(s0
0), depending on the value of a. If, for
example, Bob’s choice is c = 0 as in Figure 4.1 and s = s0 after Interactive
Hashing, then he would choose the latter option.
Figure 4.4: After Bob has passed the tests in Step 9, both players ignore the
bits at positions s0 [ s1 and form strings R0;R1 from the remaining bits. Then
independent applications of Privacy Ampliﬁcation on R0;R1 give rise to r0;r1 2
f0;1g
k.
79Gains in eﬃciency
As k ￿ n￿8xn where x is a very small constant less than 1, the expansion factor
n=k is 1 + ￿ for ￿ =
8x
1￿8x ￿ 8x. As one cannot do better than n=k = 1 (see
[DM99] for a formal proof of this fact), our expansion factor is asymptotically
optimal and represents a two-fold improvement over the corresponding reduction
in [BCW03] where the expansion factor is at least 2 + ￿0.
4.2.3 Proof of Security and Practicality
Theorem 4.1 establishes that Protocol 4.2 rarely needs to be aborted when both
participants are honest while Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 establish the protocol’s secu-
rity against a dishonest sender and a dishonest receiver, respectively.
Theorem 4.1. The probability of failure of Protocol 4.2 when both participants
are honest is exponentially small in n.
Proof. If both parties are honest then Protocol 4.2 can only fail at Step 6. We
will show that for any (ﬁxed) w 2 f0;1g
m that Bob inputs to Interactive Hashing
at Step 5, the probability that the second output w0 is such that js \ s0j > 2x2n
is exponentially small in n. Let s be the subset corresponding to Bob’s choice of
w. We will call a subset s0 bad if js \ s0j > 2x2n. Likewise, we will call a string
w0 2 f0;1g
m bad if it maps to a bad subset.
We start by showing that the fraction of bad subsets is exponentially small in n.
Suppose s0 ￿ I is randomly chosen among all subsets of cardinality xn. One way
to choose s0 is by sequentially selecting xn positions uniformly at random without
80repetition among all n positions in I. The probability qi that the ithposition thus
chosen happens to collide with one of the xn positions in s satisﬁes
qi <
xn
n ￿ xn
=
x
1 ￿ x
:
As a thought experiment, suppose that one were to choose xn positions inde-
pendently at random, so that each position collides with an element of s with
probability exactly q =
x
1￿x. Since 8i; qi < q, this artiﬁcial way of choosing
xn positions can only increase the probability of ending up with more than 2x2n
collisions. We can use the Chernoﬀ bound (Equation (A.2)) to upper bound this
(larger) probability. Assuming x < 1=2 and setting ￿ = 1 ￿ 2x we get
Pr

B(xn;
x
1 ￿ x
) > 2x
2n

￿ ￿
0
where ￿0 = e
￿
(1￿2x)2x2
4(1￿x) n. This in turn guarantees that when s0 is selected in the
appropriate way, the event js \ s0j > 2x2n occurs with probability ￿ < ￿0. In
other words, the fraction of bad subsets is upper bounded by ￿ < ￿0.
By Lemma 4.1, the fraction of bad strings in f0;1g
m is at most 2￿. As w
itself is bad, it follows that among all 2m ￿1 strings other than w the fraction of
bad strings is no larger than 2￿. Since by Property 2 of Interactive Hashing, w
is paired with some uniformly chosen w0 6= w, the probability that the protocol
aborts at Step 6 is upper bounded by 2￿ < 2￿e
￿
(1￿2x)2x2
4(1￿x) n, which is exponentially
small in n.
81Remark: Theorem 4.1 establishes that Condition 1 (Correctness) of The-
orem 3.2 deﬁning the information theoretic properties of a perfect protocol for
Randomized Oblivious Transfer is met except with exponentially small probability.
Indeed, unless the protocol aborts, the honest sender does not output anything
and the honest receiver always succeeds in recovering one of the two strings.
Theorem 4.2. Alice learns nothing about (honest) Bob’s choice bit c.
Proof. During Bob’s interaction with Alice, his choice bit c comes into play only
during the Bit OT executions of Step 4 and later at Step 8 when Bob announces
a = b￿c. As Bit OT is secure by assumption, Alice cannot obtain any information
about c in Step 4. As for Step 8, since (honest) Bob chooses w uniformly at
random in f0;1g
m, both w0 and w1 are a priori equally likely choices. By Property
1 of Interactive Hashing (see Section 2.2), the a posteriori probabilities of w0;w1
having been Bob’s input are then equal as well. Consequently, Alice cannot guess
b with probability higher than 1=2 and the same holds for c = a ￿ b.
Remark: Theorem 4.2 establishes that Condition 3 (Security for Player 2) of
Theorem 3.2 is perfectly met in all cases since given all available information, the
sender’s entropy about the receiver’s choice bit c is 1 bit.
Security against a dishonest Bob
The proof of Theorem 4.3 establishing the protocol’s security against a dishonest
Bob is considerably more involved. The main idea is that if Bob deviates from
the protocol more than a small fraction of the time, then he must be missing
“too many” bits of both T0 and T1 and will thus fail to pass the tests at Step
828 with overwhelming probability. If, on the other hand, he deviates only a small
fraction of the time, then Privacy Ampliﬁcation at Step 11 will eﬀectively destroy
the illegal information he may have obtained. We start with some deﬁnitions and
lemmas that will help to prove Theorem 4.3.
Deﬁnition 4.1. For a bit string T, deﬁne up(T) to be the number of bits in T
that can be guessed correctly with probability at most p < 1. These bits will be
referred to as unknown bits.
Deﬁnition 4.2. Let s ￿ I. Assuming Deﬁnition 4.1, we call s good for T 2
f0;1g
n if up(T(s)) ￿ 3x2n, namely if T(s) does not contain more than 3x2n
unknown bits. Otherwise, we call s bad for T. We say that s is good for either
T0 or T1 if at least one of up(T0(s));up(T1(s)) does not exceed 3x2n.
Deﬁnition 4.3. Let w be a string in f0;1g
m. We call w good for T if the subset
s it encodes is good for T according to Deﬁnition 4.2. Otherwise, w is bad for
T.
Lemma 4.2. Let up(T) ￿ 5xn. Then among all subsets s ￿ I of cardinality xn
the fraction of good subsets for T is less than e￿x2n=8.
Proof. We will use the Probabilistic Method to show that the probability that a
randomly chosen subset s is good for T is less than e￿x2n=8. One way of choosing
s would be to sequentially choose xn positions in I at random and without
replacement. Note that regardless of previous choices, for all 1 ￿ i ￿ xn the
probability qi of position i being chosen among the up(T) positions of unknown
83bits always satisﬁes
qi >
up(T) ￿ xn
jIj
￿
5xn ￿ xn
n
= 4x:
This implies that the probability of choosing a good subset for T would be greater
if we were to choose the xn positions independently at random so that each
position corresponds to an unknown bit with probability q = 4x. In this artiﬁcial
case the distribution of the number of unknown bits is binomial with parameters
xn;4x and mean ￿ = 4x2n. Applying the Chernoﬀ bound (Equation A.1) with
￿ = 1=4 we get
Pr

B(xn;4x) ￿ 3x
2n

￿ e
￿x2n=8:
We conclude that a subset s chosen randomly in the appropriate way has proba-
bility smaller than e￿x2n=8 of being good for T, which establishes the claim.
Lemma 4.3. Let both up(T0);up(T1) ￿ 5xn. Then the fraction of strings in
f0;1g
m that are good for either T0 or T1 is no larger than 4 ￿ e￿x2n=8.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 4.2 and the Union Bound that the proportion of
good subsets for either T0 or T1 is no larger than 2￿e￿x2n=8. Lemma 4.1 in turn
guarantees that the fraction of strings in f0;1g
m that are good for either T0 or
T1 is at most 4 ￿ e￿x2n=8.
Lemma 4.4. Let both up(T0);up(T1) ￿ 5xn. Then the probability that (dis-
honest) Bob will clear Step 9 is exponentially small in n.
Proof. By Lemma 4.3, the proportion of good strings in f0;1g
m for either T0
or T1 is at most 4 ￿ e￿x2n=8. By Theorem 2.1, Interactive Hashing guarantees
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larger than
￿1 = 15:6805 ￿ 4 ￿ e
￿x2n=8:
Consequently, with probability at least 1 ￿ ￿1, at least one of the two bit strings
(without loss of generality, w1) is bad for both T0 and T1. In other words, w1
corresponds to a subset s1 with both up(T0(s1));up(T1(s1)) ￿ 3x2n. Moreover,
as Alice did not abort at Step 6 it must be the case that js0 \ s1j ￿ 2x2n.
It follows that both up(T0(s0
1));up(T1(s0
1)) ￿ 3x2n ￿ 2x2n = x2n. Therefore,
however Bob decides to respond in Step 8, he must correctly guess the value of at
least x2n unknown bits in one of T0;T1. As the bits were independently chosen,
the probability of guessing them all correctly is no larger than ￿2 = px2n.
Bob will clear Step 9 only if he got two good strings from Interactive Hashing
or got at least one bad string and then correctly guessed all the relevant bits.
This probability is upper bounded by ￿1 + ￿2, which is exponentially small in n.
Theorem 4.3. The probability of (dishonest) Bob successfully cheating in Pro-
tocol 4.2 is exponentially small in n.
Proof. Let v0 ￿ I be the subset of all positions i where (dishonest) Bob obtained
ti
0 during Step 4. Let v1 be deﬁned analogously. Note that v0 \ v1 = ;. We
distinguish two cases, which taken together establish the claim.
Case 1: Both jv0j;jv1j ￿ n ￿ 5xn.
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fail to clear Step 9 except with exponentially (in n) small probability.
Case 2: One of jv0j;jv1j is greater than n ￿ 5xn.
Without loss of generality, let jv0j > n￿5xn. Then Bob knows less than 5xn
bits about T1, and consequently, less than 5xn bits about R1 = T1(J). Note that
as T0;T1 are independently chosen, even if an oracle were to provide to Bob all
the bits of T0 (or R0, or r0), he would obtain no new information about R1. As
u1=2 (R1) ￿ j￿5xn, Privacy Ampliﬁcation with output length k = (j￿5xn)￿xn
destroys all but an exponentially (in n) small amount of information about r1,
with probability exponentially close to 1.
Remark: Theorem 4.3 shows that Protocol 4.2 comes arbitrarily close to
satisfying Condition 2 (Security for Player 1) of Theorem 3.2 deﬁning the in-
formation theoretic properties of a perfect protocol for Randomized Oblivious
Transfer. Recall that in Case 1, dishonest Bob is caught except with exponen-
tially small probability while in Case 2, there always exists some “eﬀective” c0
such that jvc0j > n￿5xn, determined by the end of Step 4. Since Alice’s random
strings r0;r1 are only determined after applying the hash functions h0;h1 cho-
sen at Step 11, c0 is independent of r0;r1. Moreover, as we have seen, Privacy
Ampliﬁcation guarantees that the entropy of r￿ c0 given all available information is
exponentially close to k.
864.3 Extension to weaker variants of Bit OT
We demonstrate that Protocol 4.2 can accommodate certain weaker versions of
Bit OT, speciﬁcally XOT, GOT and UOT as described in Section 3.2. We show
that the Protocol requires no modiﬁcation at all if Bit OT is replaced with XOT,
while a virtually imperceptible decrease in the output length k guarantees its
security with GOT. Decreasing k even further allows us to prove the Protocol’s
security when Bob has access to UOT with ￿ ￿ 1. As in all three cases honest
Bob’s choices during Step 4 are identical to the case of Bit OT and remain equally
well hidden from Alice’s view, the proofs of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 (establishing the
Protocol’s practicality and security against dishonest Alice) carry over verbatim
to the new settings.
On the other hand, arguing that the Protocol remains secure against dishonest
Bob becomes even more involved and requires a separate analysis in each case.
However, the basic idea remains the same as in the case of Bit OT and consists
in showing that if Bob has deviated “signiﬁcantly” from the protocol then he gets
caught with overwhelming probability, and if he has not, then Privacy Ampliﬁca-
tion eﬀectively eliminates any illegal information he may have accumulated.
4.3.1 Security against a dishonest Bob using XOT
Theorem 4.4. The probability of (dishonest) Bob successfully cheating in Pro-
tocol 4.2 is exponentially small in n even if the Bit OT protocol is replaced with
XOT.
Proof. Let v0;v1;v￿ ￿ I denote the sets of positions i where (dishonest) Bob
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0;ti
1;ti
￿ = ti
0 ￿ ti
1, respectively, during Step 4. As in the proof of
Theorem 4.2, we distinguish two cases, in both of which the probability of cheating
is exponentially small in n, as desired.
Case 1: One of jv0j;jv1j is greater than n ￿ 5xn.
Without loss of generality, let jv0j > n ￿ 5xn. Then jv1 [ v￿j < 5xn.
Consequently, Bob knows less than 5xn bits about R1 even if he is provided with
all the bits of T0 by an oracle after Step 4. We note in passing that such oracle
information can only be helpful for the positions in v￿. Since u1=2 (R1) > j ￿5xn,
Privacy Ampliﬁcation with output length k = (j ￿ 5xn) ￿ xn destroys all but
an exponentially (in n) small amount of information about r1, with probability
exponentially close to 1.
Case 2: Both jv0j;jv1j ￿ n ￿ 5xn.
This implies that both jv1 [ v￿j and jv0 [ v￿j are at least 5xn and conse-
quently both u1=2 (T0) and u1=2 (T1) are at least 5xn. By Lemma 4.4, Bob will
fail to clear Step 9 except with exponentially (in n) small probability.
Gains in eﬃciency
The expansion factor is identical to the case of Bit OT (and optimal). The
reduction of String OT to XOT using Protocol 4.2 is thus again twice as eﬃcient
compared to the one in [BCW03].
884.3.2 Security against a dishonest Bob using GOT
In the case of Generalized OT, during round i of Step 4 dishonest Bob can choose
to obtain f (ti
0;ti
1) for any of the 16 functions f : f0;1g
2 7! f0;1g. Without
loss of generality, we will assume that Bob never requests the two constant
functions as this would provide him with no information. It is not diﬃcult to
see that in our context, the information content of each of the remaining 14
functions is equivalent to that of one of the four functions f0;f1;f￿;fAND deﬁned
in Equation (4.1) below. We will thus assume that Bob always requests the output
of one of these functions. In keeping with the notation of previous sections we
let v0;v1;v￿;vAND ￿ I be the positions where Bob requested f0;f1;f￿;fAND,
respectively.
f0(t0;t1) = t0 f￿(t0;t1) = t0 ￿ t1
f1(t0;t1) = t1 fAND(t0;t1) = t0 ^ t1:
(4.1)
A necessary modiﬁcation to Protocol 4.2
Our proof of security requires that the output length of the hash functions used
for Privacy Ampliﬁcation be slightly shorter than in the case of Bit OT and XOT.
Speciﬁcally, in Step 11 we let k = (j ￿ 8xn) ￿ xn ￿ n ￿ 11xn.
The security analysis of the Protocol in this setting is somewhat more com-
plicated compared to the case of Bit OT and XOT. This is due to the fact that
requesting fAND may or may not result in loss of information about (t0;t1): with
probability 1/4 the output of fAND is 1 and so Bob learns both bits, while with
complementary probability 3/4 the output is 0 in which case the input bits were
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t0;t1 are unknown as each can be guessed correctly with probability at most 2=3.
Complications arising from adaptive strategies
If dishonest Bob’s requests could be assumed to be ﬁxed ahead of time, our anal-
ysis would be quite straightforward since we could claim that among all requests
in vAND, with high probability a fraction 3=4 ￿ ￿ would produce an output of 0
and thus both t0;t1 would be added to the set of unknown bits in T0;T1. Our
task is complicated by the fact that Bob obtains the output of the function he
requested immediately after each round and can thus adapt his future strategy
to past results. For example, Bob may be very risk-averse and start by asking for
fAND in the ﬁrst round. If he is lucky and the output is 1, he asks for fAND again,
until he gets unlucky in which case he starts behaving honestly. This strategy
makes it almost impossible to catch Bob cheating while it allows Bob to learn
both r0;r1 with some nonzero — but admittedly quite small — probability. This
example illustrates that we cannot assume that jvANDj is known ahead of time
and remains independent of results obtained during the n executions of Step 4.
Dealing with adaptive strategies
In order to prove the security of the protocol for any conceivable strategy that
dishonest Bob might use, we start by observing that at the end of Step 4 one of
the following two cases always holds:
Case 1: One of jv0j;jv1j > n ￿ 8xn.
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Note that these two cases refer only to the types of requests issued by Bob
during Step 4 and do not depend in any way on the results obtained along the
way. Given any (adaptive) strategy S for Bob, one can construct the following
two strategies: Strategy S1 begins by making the same choices as S but ensures
that eventually the condition in Case 1 will be met: it “steps on the brakes” just
before this constraint becomes impossible to meet in the future and makes its
own choices from that point on in order to meet its goal. Similarly, Strategy S2
initially copies the choices of S but if necessary, stops following them to ensure
that the condition of Case 2 is met. Let ￿;￿1;￿2 be the probabilities of successfully
cheating using Strategies S;S1;S2, respectively. We will argue that ￿ ￿ ￿1 +￿2.
To see this, imagine three parallel universes in which Bob is interacting with
Alice using strategies S;S1;S2, respectively. Note that by the end of Step 4,
the universe of Strategy S is identical either to the Universe of Strategy S1 or
to the Universe of Strategy S2 (one of S1;S2 never had to “brake”). Therefore,
Strategy S succeeds only if one of S1;S2 succeeds and so ￿ ￿ ￿1 + ￿2.
Remark: this upper bound is not unreasonably large: S1 and S2 might be
successful in disjoint events. As S has more ﬂexibility than either of them during
Step 4, it is conceivable that ￿ > max(￿1;￿2).
It remains to prove that both ￿1;￿2 are exponentially small in n. To do this,
we let ￿1;￿2 be any adaptive strategies ensuring that the conditions of Case
1 and Case 2, respectively, are met. We will show that for any such strategies
(thus, for S0;S1 as well), the probabilities of success ￿1;￿2 are exponentially
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Theorem 4.5. The probability of (dishonest) Bob cheating in (modiﬁed) Proto-
col 4.2 is exponentially small in n even if Bit OT is replaced with GOT.
Proof. We will prove that ￿1;￿2 are both exponentially small in n.
Probability of cheating using any Strategy ￿1 Without loss of generality,
let jv0j > n￿8xn at the end of Step 4. Then Bob knows at most 8xn bits about
T1, even if he is provided with all the bits of T0 by an oracle. Consequently,
u1=2 (R1) > j ￿8xn and therefore using Privacy Ampliﬁcation with output length
k = (j ￿ 8xn) ￿ xn ￿ n ￿ 11xn will result in Bob having only an exponentially
small amount of information about r1 (even given r0), except with an exponentially
small probability ￿1.
Probability of cheating using any Strategy ￿2 We start by showing that
Pr

u2=3 (T1) ￿ 5xn

is small. Since any such strategy guarantees that jv1j ￿ n￿
8xn, it follows that jv0 [ v￿ [ vANDj ￿ 8xn. Given this constraint, the probability
that u2=3 (T1) ￿ 5xn is maximized if jvANDj = 8xn;jv0j = jv￿j = 0. This is
because each request in v0 and v￿ results with certainty in the corresponding
bit in T1 being unknown, while a request in vAND produces an unknown bit in
T1 with probability 3=4 (moreover, in this case the unknown bit can be guessed
correctly with probability 2=3 instead of 1=2). Using the Chernoﬀ bound (Equation
A.1) with (n;p;￿) 7! (8xn; 3=4; 1=6) gives
Pr

u2=3 (T1) ￿ 5xn

￿ Pr

B(8xn;
3
4
) ￿ 5xn

￿ e
￿xn=12:
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Bound, u2=3 (T0) and u2=3 (T1) are both at least 5xn except with probability at
most 2 ￿ e￿xn=12. In this case, Lemma 4.4 guarantees that Bob will only manage
to clear Step 9 with some exponentially (in n) small probability ￿. We conclude
that using any Strategy ￿2, Bob can successfully cheat with probability ￿2 ￿
2 ￿ e￿xn=12 + ￿ which is also exponentially small in n.
Probability of successfully cheating using any adaptive strategy S As
argued above, for any adaptive strategy S, the probability ￿ of cheating is upper
bounded by ￿1 + ￿2 ￿ ￿1 + ￿2 and hence ￿ is exponentially small in n.
Gains in eﬃciency
As k ￿ n ￿11xn where x is a very small positive constant, the expansion factor
n=k is 1+￿0 for ￿0 =
11x
1￿11x ￿ 11x. This factor is only slightly larger than the one
for the case of Bit OT and XOT and remains asymptotically optimal. Compared
to the corresponding reduction in [BCW03], ours improves eﬃciency by a factor
of about 4:8188.
4.3.3 Security against a dishonest Bob using Universal OT
In the case where Bit OT is replaced with UOT, at each execution during Step 4
dishonest Bob can choose to obtain the output of any discrete, memoryless
channel subject to the following constraint: let B0;B1 be independent, uni-
formly distributed random variables corresponding to Alice’s input bits and let
￿ = ￿(B0;B1) be the channel’s output to Bob. Then for some constant ￿ ￿ 1
93the following holds:
H((B0;B1) j ￿) ￿ ￿: (4.2)
Note that we require ￿ to be at most 1, since otherwise the channel would
disallow honest behavior as well. Let ￿ < 1=2 be a (very small) positive constant.
We can partition all possible channels satisfying the constraint of Equation 4.2
into the following three categories.
￿0: All channels satisfying H(B0 j ￿) < ￿￿ and H(B1 j B0￿) > (1 ￿ ￿)￿.
￿1: All channels satisfying H(B1 j ￿) < ￿￿ and H(B0 j B1￿) > (1 ￿ ￿)￿.
￿b: All channels satisfying H(B0 j ￿);H(B1 j ￿) ￿ ￿￿.
Let ￿(￿) be the unique solution to the equation h(x) = ￿ for x 2 [0; 1=2].
Let p0 = p1 = ￿((1 ￿ ￿)￿) and pb = ￿(￿￿). Then from Fano’s inequality and
Lemma A.1 (Section A.2) we can assert the following:
• p0 is a lower bound on the error probability when guessing the value of B1
after using a channel of type ￿0 and this is true even if the value of B0 is
known with certainty (via an oracle, say). There thus exists an indicator
random variable ￿0 (provided as side information by an oracle) which leads
to an erasure of B1 with probability 2p0. Note: when there is no erasure
(￿0 = 0) it is not necessarily the case that B1 is known with certainty.
• Likewise, p1 lower bounds the error probability when guessing B0 given the
output of a channel of type ￿1 and the value of B1. This implies the
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￿1 that leads to an erasure of B0 with probability 2p1 = 2p0.
• When using a channel of type ￿b, the probability of guessing B0 incorrectly
given the channel’s output is at least pb, and the same holds when guessing
the value of B1. Thus, there exists an indicator random variable ￿0
b (resp.
￿1
b) which, if provided by an oracle, would lead to an erasure of B0 (resp.
B1) with probability 2pb. Note that this statement is true only if the oracle
provides one of ￿0
b;￿1
b each time. To see why this is so, suppose both
were provided at the same time, with ￿0
b = 1. Since the value of ￿1
b
along with that of ￿ might convey more information about B0 than would
otherwise be available in ￿ alone, one can no longer assume that this event
corresponds to an erasure of B0.
In order to simplify our analysis we will assume that after each round of UOT in
Step 4, an oracle supplies Bob with the following side information, depending on
the type of channel that Bob used:
￿0: The exact value of B0, as well as the value of ￿0. Note that this leads to
B1 being erased with probability 2p0.
￿1: The exact value of B1, as well as the value of ￿1. Note that this leads to
B0 being erased with probability 2p1 = 2p0.
￿b: One of ￿0
b;￿1
b, chosen at random with equal probability. Note that this
leads to each of B0;B1 being erased with probability pb in each round (not
independently, though: B0 and B1 cannot be erased at the same time).
95Another modiﬁcation to Protocol 4.2
Our proof of security will require that we reduce k even further at Step 11, by
setting k = 2p0(j ￿ 8pbn). For convenience, we will also set x = p2
b at Step 1.
Theorem 4.6. The probability of dishonest Bob successfully cheating in (mod-
iﬁed) Protocol 4.2 is exponentially small in n even if the Bit OT protocol is
replaced with UOT satisfying the constraint of Equation (4.2).
Proof. Let v0;v1;vb ￿ I be the positions in Step 4 where Bob selected a channel
of type ￿0;￿1;￿b, respectively. Then, at the end of Step 4 one of the following
two cases always holds:
Case 1: One of jv0j;jv1j > n ￿ 6pbn.
Case 2: Both jv0j;jv1j ￿ n ￿ 6pbn.
As in the proof of security for GOT in Section 4.3.2, we will assume the
existence of two strategies S1;S2 initially following the choices of Bob’s strategy
S, but ensuring that Case 1 and Case 2 respectively always holds. We will
show that the probabilities of successfully cheating of any adaptive strategies
￿1;￿2 satisfying the constraints of Case 1 and Case 2, respectively, are both
exponentially small in n and thus so is their sum, which in turn upper bounds
the probability that any adaptive strategy S that dishonest Bob may use will
successfully cheat.
Probability of successfully cheating using any Strategy ￿1 Without loss
of generality, let jv0j > n ￿ 6pbn at the end of Step 4. This implies that at
96least j ￿ 6pbn of the bits of R1 were received over a channel of type ￿0. Let ￿1
be the expected number of erasures in R1, resulting from the side information
￿0 provided by the oracle in each round. Then ￿1 ￿ 2p0 (j ￿ 6pbn). From
the Chernoﬀ bound (Equation A.3) we deduce that with probability exponen-
tially close to 1 there will be at least 2p0 (j ￿ 7pbn) erasures, in which case
u1=2 (R1) ￿ 2p0 (j ￿ 7pbn). Applying Privacy Ampliﬁcation with output length
k = 2p0 (j ￿ 8pbn) will thus produce an almost uniformly distributed k-bit string
r1 (independent of r0), except with exponentially (in n) small probability.
The probability of any strategy ￿1 successfully cheating is at most equal
to the probability that there are too few erasures to begin with (fewer than
2p0 (j ￿ 7pbn)) plus the probability that there are enough erasures but Privacy
Ampliﬁcation fails to produce an almost uniformly distributed string. As both
probabilities are exponentially small in n, so is their sum.
Probability of successfully cheating using any Strategy ￿2 We show that
with near certainty, both u1=2 (T0) and u1=2 (T1) are at least 5xn, which by Lemma
4.4 guarantees that Bob will fail to clear Step 9 with probability exponentially
close to 1. We start by upper bounding the probability that u1=2 (T1) ￿ 5xn.
Since jv1j ￿ n ￿ 6pbn, there are at least 6pbn bits that were either sent over
a channel of type ￿0 or ￿b. We will assume that exactly 6pbn bits were sent
over a channel of type ￿b, as this choice minimizes the expected number of
erasures in T1 given our constraints, and hence maximizes the probability that
u1=2 (T1) ￿ 5xn. Note that the expected number of erasures of B1 in this case is
97pb ￿ 6pbn = 6p2
bn = 6xn. By the Chernoﬀ bound (Equation A.1)
Pr

u1=2 (T1) ￿ 5xn

￿ Pr

B(6pbn;pb) ￿ 5p
2
bn

￿ ￿
where ￿ is exponentially small in n.
The same argument applies to u1=2 (T0). Therefore, except with probability at
most 2￿, both u1=2 (T0);u1=2 (T1) ￿ 5xn in which case, by Lemma 4.4 Bob fails
to clear Step 9 with probability 1 ￿ ￿0 where ￿0 is exponentially small in n. We
conclude that using any Strategy ￿2, Bob can successfully cheat with probability
at most 2￿ + ￿0 which is exponentially small in n.
Probability of cheating using any adaptive strategy S As argued in Section
4.3.2, the probability of successful cheating for any adaptive strategy S is upper
bounded by the sum of the largest possible probabilities of success of strategies
of type ￿1;￿2. We have shown that both of these are exponentially small.
Gains in eﬃciency
In both our reduction and that of [BCW03], the expansion factor n=k is a function
of ￿. In our case
k = 2p0 (j ￿ 8pbn)
￿ 2p0 (n ￿ 2xn ￿ 8pbn)
= 2p0
 
n ￿ 2p
2
bn ￿ 8pbn

:
98Since p0 = ￿((1 ￿ ￿)￿);pb = ￿(￿￿), for ￿ ! 0 we get p0 ! ￿(￿);pb ! 0
and therefore k ￿ 2￿(￿)n, which translates to an expansion factor of
1
2￿(￿) + ￿0.
The corresponding expansion factor in [BCW03] is at least
4ln2
pe where pe is the
unique solution in (0; 1=2] to the equation h(pe) + pe log2 3 = ￿. Thus our
expansion factor is about
4ln2
pe ￿ 2￿(￿) > 8ln2 = 5:545 times smaller than the
one in [BCW03]. Note that the inequality follows from the fact that ￿(￿) > pe.
This can be seen by observing that h(￿(￿)) = ￿ = h(pe) + pe log2 3 and thus
h(￿(￿)) > h(pe). Since both ￿(￿) and pe are at most 1=2 and the entropy
function h is strictly increasing in the range [0; 1=2], it follows that ￿(￿) > pe.
Remark: in the special case where ￿ = 1 we have ￿(￿) = 1=2 and therefore
the expansion factor is 1 + ￿0, which is optimal. Proving optimality for other
values of ￿ is left as an open problem.
4.4 Conclusion, open problems and possible av-
enues of further research
In this Chapter, we have demonstrated how tests based on Interactive Hashing
can be embedded in reductions of String OT to Bit OT and various weaker
primitives in order to ensure the receiver’s adherence to the protocol. By severely
limiting a dishonest receiver’s ability to deviate from the protocol without getting
caught, these tests allow our reductions to be much more eﬃcient than others
in the literature, without any appreciable impact on security. Our reductions are
provably asymptotically optimal for the case of Bit OT, XOT and GOT, as well
99as for the special case of UOT where ￿ = 1. Moreover, our reductions are more
general since they can use any 2-universal family of hash functions to perform
Privacy Ampliﬁcation.
We end this chapter by listing some problems that our current work leaves
open, as well as some suggestions for further research.
• Modify Protocol 4.2 so that it never aborts when both participants are
honest. One possibility to go about this is to abolish Step 6 and show that
Interactive Hashing at Step 5 would be eﬀective in preventing dishonest
Bob from obtaining subsets s0, s1 that have too large an intersection.
• Prove that our reduction is optimal for all ￿ in the case of UOT, or modify
it accordingly to achieve optimality.
• Replace the Interactive Hashing Protocol (Protocol 2.1) with an appropri-
ately adapted implementation of the constant round Protocol of [DHRS04]
(see Section 2.3.4) and prove that the ensuing reduction (Protocol 4.2)
remains secure.
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Reducing String OT to Rabin OT
As we have seen in Chapter 4,
 2
1

–String OT
k can be eﬃciently reduced, via
 2
1

–ROT
k, to Bit OT and other weaker variants. As Bit OT is in turn equivalent
to Rabin OT (see [Cré87]), it follows that a reduction of
 2
1

–String OT
k to
Rabin OT is also possible. In fact, the main technique behind the reduction of
Bit OT to Rabin OT in [Cré87] can be used in conjunction with later results
on Privacy Ampliﬁcation [BBR88] to provide a direct reduction of
 2
1

–ROT
k
requiring n = (4 + ￿)k executions of Rabin OT.
In the present Chapter we will be concerned with providing an optimal re-
duction of
 2
1

–ROT
k to Rabin OT. Our reduction (Protocol 5.1) employs tests
based on Interactive Hashing similar to those used in the reduction of
 2
1

–ROT
k
to
 2
1

–Bit OT (Protocol 4.2) in order to prevent a dishonest receiver from de-
viating “too much” from the prescribed behavior. This allows us to implement
101 2
1

–ROT
k with only n = (2 + ￿0)k executions of Rabin OT. We observe that
after n executions of Rabin OT, the expected entropy of the receiver about the
transmitted bits is n=2. This precludes reductions with an expansion factor n=k
smaller than 2 (see [DM99] for a formal proof) and suggests that this reduction,
just like the one in Protocol 4.2, is asymptotically optimal.
Remark: As in Chapter 4, we will be focusing on reducing
 2
1

–ROT
k rather
than
 2
1

–String OT
k since the former is easier to work with even though the two
are in fact equivalent (see Section 3.5.3).
5.1 Optimally reducing
 2
1

–ROT
k to Rabin OT
using Interactive Hashing
Notation and conventions
Unless otherwise noted, our notation is consistent with that of Chapter 4, in par-
ticular Section 4.2.1. In our reduction (Protocol 5.1), Alice transmits n randomly
chosen bits to Bob using n executions of Rabin Bit OT. We will call the positions
of bits received by Bob “good” while the “bad positions” will be those of bits
that were erased during the transfer. Let G and B be the set of all good and bad
positions, respectively, with each element being an integer in the interval [1;n].
Alice and Bob choose x to be a (very small) positive constant that will determine
the fraction of bits that will be sacriﬁced for tests. Let y = 1=2 ￿ 2x and let I
denote the set of all positions 1;:::;yn. Let R be a bit string of length yn. For
any subset s ￿ I, we will let R(s) be the substring consisting of the bits of R at
102the positions in s, in increasing order of position. Using this notation, note that
R(I) = R.
Encoding of Subsets as Bit Strings
Alice and Bob will use the modiﬁed encoding scheme of Section 4.2.1 to en-
code subsets s ￿ I of cardinality xn (out of yn) as bit strings of length m =
l
log
 yn
xn
m
.
5.1.1 The reduction
Protocol 5.1 presents our reduction of
 2
1

–ROT
k to Rabin OT.
Intuition behind Protocol 5.1
At Step 1 Alice and Bob agree on the value of x which determines the number
of bits that will eventually be used for tests. At Step 2 Alice uses n executions of
Rabin OT to transmit n randomly chosen bits to Bob. As erasures occur inde-
pendently with probability 1=2 at every execution, with overwhelming probability
Bob will receive no more than (1=2 + x)n bits and no less than (1=2 ￿ x)n by the
end this step. At Step 3, Bob ensures that enough bits have been received for
the needs of the rest of the protocol, and aborts otherwise. The good and bad
positions are collected in sets G and B, respectively. At Step 4, Bob chooses
c 2R f0;1g at random and deﬁnes two bit strings R0;R1 of length yn each
so that Rc is composed exclusively of good positions. As for R￿ c, the protocol
requires that it has at least xn good positions spread randomly throughout R￿ c
103Protocol 5.1 Reduction of
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1

–ROT
k to Rabin Bit OT using IH
1. Alice and Bob select a (typically very small) positive constant x < 1=4 and
set y = 1=2 ￿ 2x.
2. Alice transmits n random bits using n executions of Rabin OT.
3. Bob collects the good and bad positions in sets G and B, respectively. He
aborts if jGj < (1=2 ￿ x)n = yn + xn.
4. Bob chooses at random c 2R f0;1g as well as w 2R f0;1g
m, where
m =
l
log
 yn
xn
m
. He decodes w into a subset s of cardinality xn (out of
yn) using the encoding scheme of Section 4.2.1. He then deﬁnes two yn–
bit strings Rc and R￿ c as follows: yn positions from G are chosen at random
and without repetition. The corresponding bits, in the order chosen, make
up Rc. For R￿ c, xn (new) positions are chosen at random from G, and
deﬁne substring R￿ c(s). For the remainder, yn￿xn positions are randomly
chosen from G [ B.
5. Bob announces the bit positions making up R0 and R1. Alice checks that
no bit position appears more than once.
6. Bob sends w to Alice using Interactive Hashing (Protocol 2.1). Let w0;w1
be the output strings, let s0;s1 ￿ I be the corresponding subsets of cardi-
nality xn and let b 2 f0;1g be such that wb = w.
7. Bob announces a = b ￿ c as well as R0(s1￿a) and R1(sa).
8. Alice checks that the substrings announced contain no errors.
9. Alice announces h0;h1, chosen randomly and independently from a 2-
universal family of hash functions with input length yn and output length
k = yn ￿ 6xn. She sets r0 = h0(R0) and r1 = h1(R1).
10. Bob sets rc = hc(Rc).
104— see Figure 5.1. To this eﬀect, Bob chooses a substring s of cardinality xn.
This choice is done by ﬁrst choosing an m–bit string w uniformly at random and
then using the encoding scheme of Section 4.2.1 to map it into s. The fact that
the choice of w was uniform will be crucial in ensuring that Bob’s choice bit c
remains hidden from Alice at later steps. We observe that s is not entirely uni-
formly selected since the encoding scheme maps some subsets to two bit strings
and others to only one. This, however, will turn out not to be important in our
scenario.
At Step 5, Bob provides a description of R0;R1 to Alice, who makes routine
checks to ensure that both strings are properly constructed. As from the point of
view of (dishonest) Alice both R0 and R1 are equally likely to consist entirely of
good positions for Bob, she cannot guess which of the two is Rc with probability
greater than 1=2 and thus (honest) Bob’s choice bit c is perfectly hidden.
Steps 6 through 8 introduce tests based on Interactive Hashing that are de-
signed to catch a dishonest Bob who deviates from the prescribed behavior at
Step 5 by putting “too many” good positions in both R0 and R1. The tests allow
Alice to verify that Bob has indeed used almost exclusively good bits to construct
one of R0;R1. If so, then Bob has very little information about the other string
(a fact that will be used later at Step 9 to set the parameters for Privacy Am-
pliﬁcation). More speciﬁcally, at Step 6 Bob uses Interactive Hashing to send
to Alice string w encoding s ￿ I (recall that, if Bob is honest, then he knows
all of R￿ c(s)). The output of Interactive Hashing consists of two strings w0;w1
encoding subsets s0;s1 — see Figure 5.2 — and there must exist b 2 f0;1g such
105that wb = w. While the value of b is known to Bob, it is completely hidden from
(any dishonest) Alice thanks to Property 1 of Interactive Hashing and the fact
that both w0 and w1 are equally likely to have been chosen by Bob at Step 4. At
Step 7, (honest) Bob eﬀectively announces substrings Rc(s￿ b) and R￿ c(sb), both
of which consist entirely of good positions — see Figure 5.3. Note that Bob’s
choice of which substrings to announce does not carry any information related to
c beyond the value of a = b ￿ c which was announced at the beginning of the
step. Consequently, as long as Alice cannot guess b, Bob’s choice bit c remains
perfectly hidden from her.
While these tests are easy to pass for an honest Bob, a dishonest Bob who
has deviated “signiﬁcantly” from the protocol will get caught with overwhelm-
ing probability and cause the protocol to abort, while a dishonest Bob who has
deviated only slightly will obtain no advantage in the end. The reasoning is as
follows: by the properties of Rabin OT and the Chernoﬀ bound, Bob receives no
more than (1=2 + x)n bits during Step 4 except with some probability exponen-
tially small in n. Assuming that this is the case, we observe that since R0 and R1
are made up of distinct bit positions and have length yn = (1=2 ￿ 2x)n each, at
least one of the two — say, without loss of generality, R0 — will consist mostly
of good positions (Case 1) or else both R0;R1 will have a signiﬁcant fraction
of bad positions (Case 2). In Case 1, R1 will necessarily consist mostly of bad
positions and so at Step 9, Privacy Ampliﬁcation with output length k slightly
less than yn will result in an almost uniformly distributed1 string r1 — see Figure
5.4. As for Case 2, recall that Property 3 of Interactive Hashing guarantees that
1Note that r1 would be almost uniform even if Bob were given R0 (or r0) by an oracle.
106the choice of at least one of w0;w1 (say, without loss of generality, w1) was eﬀec-
tively out of Bob’s control. This also holds for the corresponding subset s1 which,
with overwhelming probability, will be such that both R0(s1) and R1(s1) contain
several bad positions each. Consequently, whatever value of a (dishonest) Bob
announces at Step 7, in order to pass the tests he will have to correctly guess
the value of a large number of unknown bits, which can only happen with neg-
ligible probability. It follows that, except with negligible probability, either Bob
has not deviated much from the prescribed behavior and so Privacy Ampliﬁcation
destroys any illegal information he has gathered, or else Bob gets caught cheating
at Step 8 in which case Alice aborts the protocol.
Lastly, at Step 10 (honest) Bob can easily obtain rc by applying the appropriate
hash function to Rc, which he knows completely.
Gains in eﬃciency
We ﬁrst observe that a reduction of
 2
1

–Bit OT to Rabin OT was provided in
[Cré87]. It is not hard to see that the approach of [Cré87] can be combined with
Privacy Ampliﬁcation [BBR88] to provide a reduction of
 2
1

–ROT
k to Rabin OT.
The main diﬀerence between this approach and ours is that without the tests
ensuring that one of R0;R1 is made almost exclusively of good positions, one
has to make the assumption that in the worst case, (dishonest) Bob could have
divided the good positions evenly between the two strings. To protect against
this possibility, the output of Privacy Ampliﬁcation must be reduced to less than
half of the length of each string, yielding an overall expansion factor n=k of at
107Figure 5.1: Bob constructs two strings, R0;R1 by selecting only good positions
for the whole of Rc as well as for a small, random subset s ￿ I of all positions
in R￿ c. The rest of R￿ c consists of leftover, mostly bad positions. In the Figure,
c = 0. Note that while s is shown here as a contiguous block, in reality the
positions it represents are generally distributed throughout R￿ c.
Figure 5.2: Honest Bob sends the string w encoding subset s to Alice through
Interactive Hashing. This procedure produces two outputs w0;w1, encoding two
subsets s0;s1. Alice does not know which of the two outputs was Bob’s input.
108Figure 5.3: Alice expects Bob to announce either R0(s0) and R1(s1) or R0(s1)
and R1(s0), depending on the value of a. If Bob’s choice was c = 0 as in Figure
5.1 and b = 0 at Step 6, then Bob would choose the latter option.
Figure 5.4: Alice performs Privacy Ampliﬁcation on R0;R1 independently, by
randomly choosing two functions h0;h1 from a 2-universal family. This results in
two shorter strings r0;r1 2 f0;1g
k. If Bob’s choice was c = 0 then he would
know r0 and have practically no information about r1, except with negligible
probability.
109least 4 + ￿.
In our case, as k = yn ￿ 6xn = (1=2 ￿ 8x)n where x is a very small positive
constant, the expansion factor n=k is 2+￿0 for ￿0 =
16x
1=2￿8x ￿ 32x. This represents
a two-fold improvement over the method described above. Moreover, since the n
bits transmitted at Step 2 give rise to n=2 bits of entropy on average and in any
reduction of
 2
1

–ROT
k the length of the strings k cannot exceed the amount of
available entropy [DM99], our reduction is in fact asymptotically optimal.
5.1.2 Proof of Security and Practicality
Theorem 5.1 establishes that Protocol 5.1 rarely needs to be aborted when both
participants are honest while Theorems 5.2 and 5.3 establish the protocol’s secu-
rity against a dishonest sender Alice and a dishonest receiver Bob, respectively.
Theorem 5.1. The probability of failure of Protocol 5.1 with honest participants
is exponentially small in n.
Proof. If both parties are honest, Protocol 5.1 can only fail at Step 3, namely if
the n executions of Rabin OT at Step 2 have not produced enough good positions.
Recalling that erasures occur independently with probability 1=2, we can use the
Chernoﬀ bound (Equation A.1) with (n;p;￿;￿) 7! (n; 1=2;2x; n=2) to establish
that
Pr[jGj < (1=2 ￿ x)n)] ￿ e
￿x2n:
Note that in the unlikely event that the protocol is aborted, no private information
of either party has been compromised.
110Theorem 5.2. Alice learns nothing about (honest) Bob’s choice bit c.
Proof. During Bob’s interaction with Alice, c comes into play only at Steps 5
and 7. By the properties of Rabin OT, after each execution at Step 2, Alice
cannot guess with probability greater than 1=2 whether Bob received the bit or an
erasure. Consequently, when Bob announces R0;R1 at Step 5, from Alice’s point
of view both strings have equal probability of corresponding to Rc (namely, of
being made up entirely of good positions). At Step 7 Bob announces a = b ￿c,
so Alice can correctly guess c if and only if she can correctly guess the value of
b such that w = wb after Interactive Hashing at Step 6. As the input w was
chosen uniformly at random, Property 1 of Interactive Hashing establishes that
from Alice’s point of view w0;w1 both have probability exactly 1=2 of having been
Bob’s input w and thus b is uniformly distributed and perfectly hides the value
of c.
Security against a dishonest Bob
Theorem 5.3. The probability of (dishonest) Bob successfully cheating in Pro-
tocol 5.1 is exponentially small in n.
The proof of Theorem 5.3 has many similarities to the proof of Theorem 4.3.
In a nutshell, the main idea is that Bob has only about n=2 good positions at the
end of Step 2, except with some probability exponentially small in n. There are
two cases to consider. In Case 1, Bob uses “many” good positions in both R0
and R1, which means that both strings will necessarily have several bad positions
as well. Consequently, with overwhelming probability the subsets produced at
111Step 6 will contain many positions corresponding to bits that are unknown to
Bob. As a result, except in the unlikely event that Bob guesses all the unknown
bits correctly at Step 7, he will fail to clear Alice’s checks at Step 8. In Case 2,
Bob uses only a few good positions in one of R0;R1 (perhaps a few more than
the protocol prescribes). In this case, Bob may well be able to pass the tests at
Step 8 but Privacy Ampliﬁcation at Step 9 will then eﬀectively destroy the partial
information Bob has about one of the strings, by virtue of having included those
extra good positions in its construction.
We start with some deﬁnitions and lemmas that will help us prove Theorem
5.3.
Deﬁnition 5.1. For a bit string R, deﬁne u1=2 (R) to be the number of bits in R
whose value can only be guessed correctly with probability 1=2.
Deﬁnition 5.2. Let s ￿ I. Assuming Deﬁnition 5.1, we call s good for R if
u1=2 (R(s)) < x2n. Otherwise, we call s bad for R. Similarly, a string w 2
f0;1g
m is good for R if and only if the subset s it encodes is good for R. We
say that s is good for either R0 or R1 if at least one of u1=2 (R0(s));u1=2 (R1(s))
does not exceed x2n.
Lemma 5.1. Let R 2 f0;1g
yn be such that u1=2 (R) ￿ 2xn. Then the fraction
f of subsets s of cardinality xn that are good for R satisﬁes f < e￿x2n=4.
Proof. We will use the Probabilistic Method to show that a subset s chosen
uniformly at random would be good for R with probability less than e￿x2n=4.
One way of choosing s would be to sequentially choose at random and without
112replacement xn positions among all yn positions of R. Then for all 1 ￿ i ￿ xn,
the probability qi that position i is chosen among the u1=2 (R) bad positions always
satisﬁes
qi >
u1=2 (R) ￿ xn
yn
>
2xn ￿ xn
n=2
= 2x:
This implies that the probability of choosing a good subset for R would be strictly
greater if we were to choose the xn positions independently at random so that
each position is bad with probability q = 2x. In this artiﬁcial case, the distribution
of the number of unknown bits is binomial and we can apply the Chernoﬀ bound
(Equation A.1) with (n;p;￿;￿) 7! (xn;2x; 1=2;2x2n) to get
Pr

B(xn;2x) ￿ x
2n

￿ e
￿x2n=4:
We conclude that a subset s chosen uniformly at random in the appropriate way
has probability strictly smaller than e￿x2n=4 of being good for R, which establishes
the claim.
Lemma 5.2. Let R0;R1 2 f0;1g
yn and let both u1=2 (R0) and u1=2 (R1) be at
least 2xn. Then the fraction of strings in f0;1g
m that are good for either R0 or
R1 is no larger than 4 ￿ e￿x2n=4.
Proof. It follows directly Lemma 5.1 and the Union Bound that the fraction of
subsets s that possess this property is no larger than 2￿e￿x2n=4. By Lemma 4.1,
the fraction in f0;1g
m of strings that are mapped to such subsets by the encoding
scheme of Section 4.2.1 must be no larger than 4 ￿ e￿x2n=4.
113Lemma 5.3. In Protocol 5.1 let both u1=2 (R0);u1=2 (R1) ￿ 2xn. Then the
probability that (dishonest) Bob will clear Step 8 is exponentially small in n.
Proof. By Lemma 5.2, the proportion of strings in f0;1g
m that are good for
either R0 or R1 is at most 4 ￿ e￿x2n=4. Consequently, at Step 6 by Property 3
of Interactive Hashing the probability that (dishonest) Bob can get both w0;w1
to be good for either R0 or R1 is no larger than ￿1 = 15:6805 ￿ 4 ￿ e￿x2n=4. It
follows that with probability at least 1￿￿1, at least one of the two bit strings —
say, without loss of generality, w1 — is bad for both R0 and R1. In other words,
w1 corresponds to a subset s1 with both u1=2 (R0(s1)) and u1=2 (R1(s1)) being at
least x2n. Recalling that at Step 7 Bob must announce either R0(s1) or R1(s1),
we see that he can clear the checks of Step 8 only if he correctly guesses the
values of at least x2n unknown bits. As the bits were independently chosen, the
probability of guessing them all correctly is ￿2 < 2￿x2n.
Bob clears Step 8 only if he either gets two good strings as outputs from
Interactive Hashing or else, if he gets at least one bad string and then correctly
guesses all the relevant bits at Step 7. This probability is upper bounded by
￿1 + ￿2 which is exponentially small in n.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 5.3.
Proof of Theorem 5.3. During each execution at Step 2, Bob receives an erasure
independently with probability 1=2. From the Chernoﬀ bound (Equation A.1) with
(n;p;￿;￿) 7! (n; 1=2;2x; n=2) we obtain jBj ￿
n
2 ￿ xn except with probability
￿1 ￿ e￿x2n. We condition on jBj ￿
n
2 ￿ xn and distinguish two cases:
114Case 1: One of u1=2 (R0);u1=2 (R1) is smaller than 2xn.
Without loss of generality, let u1=2 (R0) < 2xn. We will show that R1 is
then almost entirely composed of bad positions. Recall that n ￿ 2yn = 4xn bit
positions were never used when deﬁning R0;R1. Since u1=2 (R0) + u1=2 (R1) +
4xn ￿ jBj ￿
n
2 ￿ xn, we have u1=2 (R1) ￿
n
2 ￿ 4xn ￿ 2xn ￿ xn = yn ￿ 5xn.
Consequently, at Step 9 Privacy Ampliﬁcation with output length k = yn￿6xn,
will produce a string r1 which, from Bob’s point of view, is almost uniformly
distributed in f0;1g
k except with some exponentially small (in n) probability ￿2.
Note that this property holds even if we condition on R0 (or r0) since Alice chose
her bits independently at random at Step 2.
Case 2: Both u1=2 (R0);u1=2 (R1) ￿ 2xn.
Then by Lemma 5.3 Bob will fail to clear Step 8 except with some probability
￿3 exponentially small (in n).
The probability that either too few erasures occurred or else that Bob has
successfully cheated either in Case 1 or in Case 2 is no larger than ￿1+max(￿2;￿3).
As ￿1;￿2;￿3 are all exponentially small in n, this establishes the claim.
5.2 Conclusion
We have demonstrated a direct reduction of
 2
1

–ROT
k to Rabin OT. As in
Chapter 4, our reduction relies on tests based on Interactive Hashing to verify
the receiver’s adherence to the protocol. The assurance that a dishonest receiver
cannot pass the tests unless he has deviated little from the protocol allows our
115reduction to be twice as eﬃcient as a a similar reduction without such tests,
achieving an expansion factor n=k of only 2 + ￿. Since the expected entropy of
the receiver about the n bits transmitted using Rabin OT is no larger than n=2,
our reduction is in fact optimal. Our reduction provides yet another example of
the applicability of Interactive Hashing to reductions between Oblivious Transfer
variants.
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Summary and Conclusion
The goal of this thesis has been two-fold. First, to provide a study of Interactive
Hashing in the information theoretic context. To this end, we have given a def-
inition formalizing its security properties in isolation of any speciﬁc application
setting. This abstraction enables Interactive Hashing to be treated as a crypto-
graphic primitive in its own right rather than as a class of sub-protocols whose
implementation, properties and proof of security all depend, to various extents,
on the surrounding application.
In order to demonstrate the practicality of this primitive, we have shown that
there exists at least one protocol implementing Interactive Hashing which fully
satisﬁes our security requirements. The corresponding proof of security has been
one of the major contributions of this thesis. As in other proofs in the literature
establishing the security of similar protocols, its most challenging aspect has been,
117by far, showing that if a dishonest sender starts with a small fraction of good
strings, he cannot force both outputs of the protocol to be good except with a
comparably small probability. Unlike the other proofs that focus on bounding the
number of strings remaining after each round, our proof follows the evolution of
the number of pairs of good strings instead. This is a more natural choice for our
setting as the dishonest sender succeeds if and only if exactly one pair remains at
the end. Consequently, the probability of success is simply equal to the expected
number of such pairs remaining when the protocol ﬁnishes. This observation
leads to a signiﬁcantly less complicated proof and results in a simpler, tighter
and more general upper bound on the dishonest sender’s probability of success.
Speciﬁcally, it establishes that if the fraction of good strings at the beginning of
the protocol is f , then no dishonest sender can succeed in obtaining two good
strings with probability greater than 15:6805 ￿ f . This upper bound is tight up
to a small constant since a dishonest sender who uses one of the good strings as
input and then acts honestly will succeed with probability slightly less than f .
The second goal has been to highlight the potential of Interactive Hashing
as a cryptographic primitive by demonstrating its applicability to reductions of
 2
1

–ROT
k to simpler primitives such as
 2
1

–Bit OT. In our reduction we use
tests based on Interactive Hashing to allow the sender in
 2
1

–ROT
k to query
the receiver on a small subset of the bits he obtained during the executions of
 2
1

–Bit OT. We have shown that the properties of Interactive Hashing guarantee
that on one hand, these tests do not compromise the receiver’s privacy while
on the other hand, they eﬀectively prevent a dishonest receiver from deviating
118signiﬁcantly from the prescribed behavior without getting caught. This extra
guarantee allows our reduction to take almost full advantage of the receiver’s
entropy of the transmitted bits. Speciﬁcally, we show that n = (1+￿)k executions
of
 2
1

–Bit OT suﬃce to securely implement
 2
1

–ROT
k, making our reduction at
least twice as eﬃcient as the best known constructions in the literature. As a
reduction with an expansion factor n=k smaller than 1 would be theoretically
impossible, our reduction is asymptotically optimal.
As far as weaker variants of
 2
1

–Bit OT are concerned, we have shown that
the reduction works without any modiﬁcation if
 2
1

–Bit OT is replaced with
XOR OT, while an imperceptible increase in the expansion factor allows it to
accommodate Generalized OT as well. Further modiﬁcations allow the reduction
to also cover the case of Universal OT. In the case of XOR OT and Generalized
OT our reductions remain asymptotically optimal and improve eﬃciency by a
factor of 2 and 4:8188, respectively. As for Universal OT, the reduction is more
eﬃcient than previous ones by a factor of at least 5:545, but we prove it to be
optimal only for the special case where ￿ = 1, leaving the general case as an open
problem. It should be noted that our reductions can use any 2-universal family of
hash functions in the Privacy Ampliﬁcation phase. Consequently, besides being
more eﬃcient, they are also more general than previous ones which require special
classes of hash functions.
Lastly, we have shown that our techniques can be adapted to provide a direct
reduction of
 2
1

–ROT
k to Rabin OT with an expansion factor of 2 + ￿0. This
reduction is again asymptotically optimal, and twice as eﬃcient compared to the
119case where Interactive Hashing is not used.
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Tools and Mathematical Background
A.1 Tail bounds
Let B(n;p) be the binomial distribution with parameters n;p and mean ￿ = np.
We will use the following versions of the Chernoﬀ bound [Che52] (as they appear
in [Vaz04], p.354) for 0 < ￿ ￿ 1:
Pr[B(n;p) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿] ￿ e
￿￿2￿=2 (A.1)
Pr[B(n;p) ￿ (1 + ￿)￿] ￿ e
￿￿2￿=4: (A.2)
From (A.1) we can also deduce the following inequality
Pr[B(n;p) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿n] ￿ e
￿￿2n=2: (A.3)
121A.2 Error probability and its concentration on an
erasure event
A.2.1 Fano’s lemma
(Adapted from [BCW03]) Let X be a random variable with range X and let
Y be another random variable. Let pe be the (average) error probability of
correctly guessing the value of X with any strategy given the outcome of Y .
Let H(X j Y ) denote the conditional entropy of X given Y , and let h(p)
def =
￿p logp ￿ (1 ￿ p)log(1 ￿ p). Then pe satisﬁes:
h(pe) + pe ￿ log2(jXj ￿ 1) ￿ H(X j Y ): (A.4)
A.2.2 Specifying an erasure event ￿
Let X be a binary random variable and let pe be the error probability of guessing X
correctly using an optimal strategy (in other words, pe is the minimum average
error probability). Let p ￿ pe. For a speciﬁc guessing strategy with average
guessing error at most 1=2, let E be an indicator random variable corresponding
to the event of guessing the value of X incorrectly. Note that Pr

￿ E

￿ Pr[E] ￿
pe ￿ p. Deﬁne ￿ to be another indicator random variable such that
Pr[￿ j E] =
p
Pr[E]
Pr

￿ j ￿ E

=
p
Pr

￿ E
: (A.5)
122It follows that Pr[￿] = 2p and that Pr[E j ￿] = Pr

￿ E j ￿

=
1
2. Suppose that
the value of ￿ is provided as side information by an oracle. Then with probability
2p we have ￿ = 1 in which case X is totally unknown (the probability that its
value was guessed incorrectly is 1=2). We will refer to this event as an erasure of
X. This leads to the following lemma:
Lemma A.1. Let X be a binary random variable and let pe be the error probability
when guessing X. Then X can be erased with probability 2p ￿ 2pe.
A.3 Privacy Ampliﬁcation
Privacy Ampliﬁcation [BBR88] is a technique that allows a partially known string
R to be shrunk into a shorter but almost uniformly distributed string r that can
be used eﬀectively as a one-time pad in cryptographic applications. For our needs
we will use a simpliﬁed version of the Generalized Privacy Ampliﬁcation Theorem
[BBCM95] (also covered in [BBR88]) which assumes that there are always u or
more unknown physical bits in R (as opposed to general bounds on R’s entropy).
Theorem A.1. Let R be a random variable with uniform distribution in f0;1g
n.
Let V be a random variable corresponding to Bob’s knowledge of R and suppose
that any value V = v provides no information about u or more physical bits of R.
Let s be a security parameter and let k = u￿s. Let H be a 2-Universal Family of
Hash functions mapping f0;1g
n to f0;1g
k and let H be uniformly distributed in
H. Let r = H(R) (note that H;r;R are random variables). Then the following
123holds:
H(r j V H) ￿ k ￿ log
 
1 + 2
k￿u
￿ k ￿
2k￿u
ln2
= k ￿
2￿s
ln2
: (A.6)
It follows from Equation (A.6) that I(r;V H) ￿ 2￿s=ln2. From Markov’s in-
equality it follows that the probability that Bob has more than 2￿s=2 bits of
information about r is no larger than 2￿s=2=ln2. In other words, except with
exponentially (in s) small probability, Bob’s information about r is no more than
an exponentially small fraction of a bit.
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